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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS LIMITED, a 
limited partnership, 
PHILLIP 0. BOYER, VIRGIL 
CONDON, BOYD J. FARR, 
HOMER L. HALE, MARIE M. 
IRVINE, G. KENNETH JOHNSON, 
KENNETH W. JONES, ROBERT 
C. NEWMAN, TOFFIE SAWAYA, 
RICHARD STOVER, WILLIAM 
TINGEY, JAMES E. WATTS, 
RALPH M. WRIGHT, limited 
partners, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and PAUL H. 
RICHINS; ARAL WESLEY ALLRED 
and SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, his 
wife; BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, 
LEO H. RICHINS, 
Intervening Respondent. 
REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S NATURE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The original action in the lower court was brought by the 
limited partnership, Young Farms Limited, and all of its 
limited partners as plaintiffs against the retired general 
partner and the general partner's president (see Ex. MFM, 
Richtron, Inc. brief). Later the plaintiffs amended their 
complaint to add the owners of the real property, the Allreds, 
under the contract of sale in controversy and the Bank of Utah 
(see Ex. "J", Richtron, Inc. brief). 
The plaintiffs were seeking an accounting from the 
retired general partner, a delivery of the assets from the 
general partner, a determination of the interests of the 
parties in the real property, and for damages and punitve 
damages to be determined. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
TO RICHTRON, INC.TS BRIEF 
CASE NO. 19902 
The defendants, in their Answer and Counterclaim (see 
Ex. fTGn, Richtron, Inc. brief) and their Answer and Cross-
claim to the Amended Complaint (see Ex. MKM, Richtron, Inc. 
brief) and pre-trial order (see Ex. 1, attached), made an 
issue in the lawsuit the right of the defendant, Richtron, 
Inc., to be the liquidating general partner. The Court 
entered its Partial Summary Judgment after xWr. Paul Richins 
had argued the issues relative to the right of Richtron, 
Inc. to be the liquidating general partner (see Affidavit 
of Paul H. Richins, Ex. "T", Richtron, Inc. brief and 
supporting documentation. Also see Minute Entry, Ex. 2, 
attached, and Partial Summary Judgment, Ex. MUfT, Richtron, 
Inc. brief). 
Richtron, Inc. claims that the issue of their right 
to be the general liquidating partner was never adjudicated 
in this case. However, the Court's ruling and the issues 
raised by the defendants themselves belie this contention, 
and it is clear that that is exactly what the Court ruled 
when it granted the Partial Summary Judgment dismissing 
the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins from 
the action. 
Richtron, Inc. appealed the dismissal pro se (see Ex. 
MVM, Richtron, Inc. brief) and no further action was taken 
and the appeal was dismissed and remanded. 
The defendants were ordered by Judge Palmer to deposit 
the 1980 payment on the Allred contract into the Court 
(see Ex. "I", Richtron, Inc. brief), Mthat the funds, when 
deposited, will be placed in an interest-bearing certificate 
and held pending the determination of the rights of the 
parties in the Allred contract and the properties underlying 
said contract.M 
The defendants deposited a Letter of Credit (see Ex. 
nLtr, Richtron, Inc. brief) in lieu of cash and, after several 
Orders, the cash was retrieved from the Letter of Credit (see 
Ex. "M" and ?TPfT, Richtron, Inc. brief). The Court ruled in 
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its Partial Summary Judgment (see Ex. MUM, Richtron, Inc. 
brief) that the defendant, Richtron, Inc., had no interest 
in the Allred contract, the real property which is the 
subject matter of this lawsuit. Richtron, Inc. was repre-
sented at the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by 
attorney George Handy and no objection was made by him to 
the granting of the Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Letter of Credit was deposited by both defendants, 
Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins, and not bif Leo H. Richins. 
The purpose of the $10,431 which was paid into the Court 
was to be the 1980 Allred contract payment which was with-
drawn by the defendants, Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins, 
under a tender letter (see Ex. MAA", Richtron, Inc. brief). 
The payment of the funds by the defendants was in response 
to the withdrawal of the funds from the escrow account and 
in response to their tender and offer dated December 4, 1981, 
which tender and offer the defendant, Richtron, Inc., was 
unable to perform when he made the tender (see Tr. p. 71, 
lines 14-21, Ex. 3, attached). 
In regard to Richtron, Inc.Ts contention that Judge 
Cornaby did not allow Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins to 
present evidence in their defense because they had been dis-
missed from the case, the plaintiffs-appellants made a 
motion at the hearing (see Tr. p. 5, lines 21-25, p. 6, 
lines 1-25, p. 7, lines 1-25, p. 8, lines 1-13, Ex. 4, 
attached) to reinstate the parties to the lawsuit and have 
all parties present and try all the issues before the Court. 
The defendant, Paul H. Richins, objected to the motion and 
the Court denied the motion to reinstate all parties. 
Therefore, Paul H. Richins and Richtron, Inc. had an 
opportunity to be reinstated into the lawsuit and have all 
of the issues, including the issue of the right to control, 
heard, even after the defendants dismissed their appeal and 
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the defendants objected to being reinstated into the law-
suit and can't be heard to complain about not being able 
to present evidence at this time. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 2, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Footnote #1 is a voluntary statement which has no 
basis in the record whatsoever and has no basis in fact . 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 4, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The lawsuit was filed by the limited partnership, by 
and through its limited partners and substitute general 
partner, Tower Realty, Inc. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 7, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record fails to differentiate on whose behalf the 
Barnes Banking Company provided the Letter of Credit. 
There is no indication on the Letter of Credit which of 
the two defendants the money is to be drawn in favor of 
(see Ex. "L", Richtron, Inc. brief). In Richtron, Inc.'s 
footnote #2, p. 4, Richtron, Inc. has inserted "including 
Young Farms" which was not part of the Order. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As indicated before, there is no indication that Leo 
Richins provided the Letter of Credit on behalf of Paul 
Richins, and it was ordered to be provided by the defen-
dants . 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 12 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Judge Cornaby's Order (see Ex. "Q", Richtron, Inc. 
brief) and the question of its being constitutional was 
never appealed that I am aware, unless the appeal is that 
referred to in Richtron, Inc.'s footnote #2 and, as is 
apparent from the Partial Summary Judgment (see Ex. "U", 
Richtron, Inc. brief), Richtron, Inc. was represented at 
that hearing by Mr. George Handy. There is no evidence 
in the record as to why Richtron, Inc.'s legal counsel 
withdrew. Judge Cornaby's Order was dated July 21, 1983, 
and Mr. John T. Anderson withdrew as counsel as of the 
12th day of October, 1983, just prior to the hearing on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at which time 
Mr. Handy appeared as counsel for the defendant, Richtron, 
Inc., which Order was dated the 9th day of November, 1983. 
If Richtron, Inc. was constitutionally without legal coun-
sel, it was only without legal counsel from the 12th day 
of October, 1983 until November 9, 1983 (see Ex. "UM, 
Richtron, Inc. brief). 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 13 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No relief was requested because the Order (see Ex. MI M, 
Richtron, Inc. brief) made the funds determinative upon the 
rights of the parties in the Allred contract and the Partial 
Summary Judgment (see Ex. MUn, Richtron, Inc. brief) deter-
mined that the defendants had no interest in those proper-
ties, thereby granting affirmative relief in regard to the 
$10,431 on behalf of the plaintiffs, Young Farms Limited. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement that the affidavit of Paul Richins and 
his Motion to Dismiss as against Young Farms Limited was 
never adjudicated is without merit and is not supported by 
the record. The District Court specifically ruled and 
denied Paul Richins' Motion based upon the arguments in 
his affidavit (see xMinute Entry dated November 1, 1983, 
R583, Ex. 2, attached and Ex. fTTn, Richtron, Inc. brief). 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The voluntary statement, "(because Judge Cornaby's 
Order ordered in case 29552, that no person as counsel was 
entitled to represent Richtron, -Inc. in legal proceedings 
or otherwise)" is a voluntary statement and has no basis in 
the record. In fact, the Partial Summary Judgment shows 
the defendant, Richtron, Inc., being represented by Mr. 
George Handy. 
REPLY TO FOOTNOTE #3 ON PAGE 13 
If, in fact, the defendant, Richtron, Inc., desired 
to preserve their rights pending the determination of the 
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Federal Court, they should have maintained their appeal 
or filed a proper appeal until such determination was 
made. By dismissing their appeal, and by objecting to 
plaintiff's motion to reinstate defendants (see Ex. 4, 
attached), defendant Richtron, Inc. effectively waived 
any right to object to the ruling of the District Court. 
The Federal Court's voiding of the IRS Tax Sale had no 
such effect as counsel would have the Court believe. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 20 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel's statement that "the Order does not order, 
adjudge or decree anything and is not a final order or 
judgment" is a statement of law and is not supported by 
the record. The same objection would go to the voluntary 
statements in paragraph 23 of Richtron, Inc.'s Statement 
of Facts. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 23 OF RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In view of defendant's objection to being reinstated 
(see Ex. 4, attached), the defendants precluded themselves 
from presenting evidence. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 24(d), RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Richins' tender on behalf of Richtron, Inc. (see 
Ex. "AA", Richtron, Inc. brief) was made fraudulently, 
knowing they did not have sufficient funds to make the 
tender (see Tr. p. 71, lines 14-21, Ex. 3, attached). 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPHS 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 & 30, RICHTRON, INC.'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of the facts as stated relate to the determination 
of Judge Cornaby as to who owns the $10,431 as the 1980 pay-
ment, and they are not material to the question on this 
appeal by Richtron, Inc. as to who has the right to repre-
sent the limited partnership and the determination of that 
right by the Court. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 31, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is nothing in the record which would have dis-
closed any liability of the limited partnership to the 
retired general partner and Richtron, Inc. can make no 
claim therefore because they failed to file a Counter-
claim to the Amended Complaint (see Ex. MKM, Richtron, 
Inc. brief), and the issues of an accounting and settle-
ment were effectively disposed of by the Partial Summary 
Judgment (see Ex. nUTT, Richtron, Inc. brief). 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 32, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no need for any evidence of any default as 
the issue was effectively resolved by the Court's ruling 
in the Partial Summary Judgment (see Ex. MUM, Richtron, 
Inc. brief). 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 33, RICHTRON, INC.TS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement that the retirement of the general 
partner dissolved the limited partnership is a legal 
conclusion that they are asking this Court to determine. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 34, RICHTRON, INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The effective ruling of the lower court in this 
action validates the continued business of the Young 
Farms Limited as a limited partnership and the actions 
of the general partner, Tower Realty, Inc. in regard to 
the continuing operations of the limited partnership 
(see Ex. MDDM, Richtron, Inc. brief, R678-79, Ex. 5, 
attached and R680-G87, Ex. 6, attached). The Ex. rrEEn 
of Richtron, Inc.'s brief represents the 1981 and 1982 
payments made by the plaintiffs and deposited in the 
Court. 
REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 35, RICHTRON,' INC.'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richtron, Inc. is not the stipulated, court-declared 
liquidating general partner of Young Farms Limited. Cer-
tainly these appellants have never stipulated to Rich-
tron, Inc. being the liquidating general partner. The 
Court decree referred to is in the Blackfoot Farms case, 
when plaintiffs were not a party to that action, and 
Richtron, Inc. recognises that they are not a party in 
their Motion (see Ex. 7, attached). In the Blackfoot 
Farms case, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs had 
no authority to represent Young Farms Limited and the 
action should be dismissed on the basis of such lack 
of authority. This contention was the basis for the 
Summary Judgment entered. There is no question that 
any of the party plaintiffs in this case were ever made 
a party to the Blackfoot Farms case, even though the 
attorneys for the defendants in the Blackfoot Farms 
case were the same attorneys for defendants in this 
case. 
The defendant, Richtron, Inc., has elected to bring 
an action in the Federal District Court, Case No. 
NC 84-0131A (see Ex. 8, attached), laying as a basis 
for their action the Blackfoot Farms case and seeking 
a preliminary injunction to put Richtron, Inc. and 
others in as the liquidating general partners of various 
and sundry limited partnerships, most of which are named 
in the Blackfoot Farms case. The Federal District Court 
ruled on the 27th day of February, 1985 (see Ex. 8a, 
attached), denying plaintiffs1 Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and allowing the limited partnerships to 
proceed and continue in business with the then on-going 
general partners and stating in regard to Mr. Richins 
proposed managing of the limited partnerships, TTso as 
to the liklihood of success, I don't think there is a 
liklihood of success.,r At the current time, the Federal 
District Court has effectively overruled the Blackfoot 
Farms case. Notwithstanding Judge Anderson's ruling, 
Young Farms Limited was never a party to the Blackfoot 
Farms case and cannot be bound by that decision so there 
is no basis for the factual allegation as set forth in 
paragraph 35. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.fS ARGUMENT I THAT JUDGE 
CORNABY'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULING IS NOT A FINAL 
APPEALABLE DECISION 
Judge Cornaby made a final determination in regard to 
the disposition of $10,431 which was part of this litigation 
in this action (see Ex. 2, attached). Judge Cornabyfs 
ruling in regard to the $10,431 is dispositive of that 
issue and is subject to appeal upon the conclusion of 
this action, which appeal was taken. Richtron, Inc.'s 
contention that the Findings of Fact and Ruling do not 
order, adjudge or decree anything is not well taken. If 
the Judge, in ruling, had not disposed of the 1980 pay-
ment to Mr. Leo Richins, there certainly would not be a 
need for appeal. I cannot believe that any attorney 
wrote the argument presented in Richtron, Inc.'s Argu-
ment I. If you follow the argument to its logical con-
clusion, when Richtron, Inc. argues that the Order could 
not possibly have disposed of the case because it was 
already disposed of by the dismissal two months before, 
that is exactly the argument that the appellants make 
in their original brief. The lower court has no busi-
ness disposing of the assets that are the subject matter 
of the litigation to parties that are not a part of the 
action, and when the Court does so, the only redress the 
appellants have is to the Appellate Court, which redress 
was taken. If, in fact, the Order is not a final order, 
subject to appeal, then it is null and void and the 
proceeds should be distributed in accordance with the 
ownership of the property as determined by the first 
lower court Order (see Ex. MI M, Richtron, Inc. brief), 
which payment should have been applied to the Allreds 
as the 1980 payment, and it would not have required the 
appellants to tender and pay the 1980 payment, as was 
done (see R660, Ex. 9, attached and R680, Ex. 6, attached). 
2. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S ARGUMENT II THAT THE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP HAS NOT AUTHORIZED JOSEPH S. 
KNOWLTON TO FILE OR MAINTAIN THIS APPEAL 
This is the sole issue on which the Supreme Court 
allowed Richtron, Inc. to make its appearance. The 
general partner withdrew as the general partner of the 
limited partnership known as Young Farms Limited, effec-
tive on the 29th day of December, 1980 (see plaintiff's 
Ex. "E" attached as Ex. 10). The insertion in the argu-
ment of the alleged reasons for their withdrawal has no 
basis in the record. At the time of the withdrawal of 
the general partner, the payment on the underlying con-
tract to the Allreds had not been made, even though pay-
ment to the general partner by the limited partnership 
had been made. That contract payment was not made until 
February, 1981 (see Ex. MDM, Richtron, Inc. brief). The 
underlying mortgage payment, however, was not made by 
the general partner (Tr. p. 64, lines 11-15, Ex. 11, 
attached), requiring the limited partnership and limited 
partners to make the required payment (see R268-73, Ex. 
12, attached), even though the general partner had re-
ceived sufficient funds to make these payments in Novem-
ber or December of 1980 (see Tr. p. 43, lines 5-22, 
Ex. 13, attached). 
If Richtron, Inc. had intended to act as the liqui-
dating general partner, they should have made the payments 
with the money delivered to them for that purpose. 
However, Richtron, Inc. not only withdrew but abandoned 
the limited partnership. All of the limited partnership's 
property would have been lost had not the limited partner-
ship brought this action and proceeded to make payments 
as required. In order to maintain the limited partnership, 
they appointed a general partner and amended the articles 
and brought this action to determine the rights of the 
parties to the limited partnership's properties. The 
defendants, Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins, made the 
question of whether or not they were to be a liquidating 
general partner an issue in the lawsuit through their 
Answer and Counterclaim, Answer and Crossclaim and Pre-
Trial Order (see Ex. f?GM and nKff, Richtron, Inc. brief, 
and Ex. 1, attached). The lower court disposed of that 
issue in its Partial Summary Judgment (see Ex. "U", 
Richtron, Inc. brief, and Ex. 2, attached), which Partial 
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Summary Judgment was appealed and the appeal later dis-
missed. The lower court then proceeded to allow the 
limited partnership, through its general partner, Tower 
Realty, Inc., to proceed with the action and dispose 
of the remaining issue, which issue was the ownership 
of the real property involved in the limited partner-
ship, effectively reaffirming its previous rulings. 
If the lower court had not considered the dismissal 
as dispositive of the issue as to who was going to be 
representing the limited partnership, it certainly would 
not have proceeded to conclude the litigation in the 
manner in which it was concluded. 
Footnote #4, found on page 31 of the Richtron, Inc. 
brief, is scandalous and should be stricken. Never, at 
any time, have the appellants made any representation 
that Richtron, Inc. had signed the amendment to the 
limited partnership agreement. If there was a signature 
page attached to the amendment, it was attached by mistake 
and is certainly not a fraud on the Court. Richtron, Inc. 
and its president, Paul Richins, were given the opportunity 
to be reinstated in the lawsuit when appellants' counsel 
made a motion to reinstate them at the beginning of the 
evidenciary hearing and Mr. Paul Richins objected to the 
motion and the Court denied it (see Ex. 4, attached). 
In reply to the balance of Argument II, the argument 
is refuted by point number II in Appellant's brief. 
3. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S ARGUMENT III THAT RICHTRON, 
INC. AND PAUL RICHINS CANNOT BE BOUND BY DECISIONS 
ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT IN A CASE WHERE THEY ARE NO 
LONGER PARTIES 
This contention is exactly the argument which is Point, 
1 of Appellant's Brief. The lower court had no business 
whatsoever awarding to Leo Richins the 1980 Allred contract 
payment. Leo Richins is a non-party. The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Ruling being appealed, as far as 
I can read it, certainly doesn't affect Richtron, Inc. nor 
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Paul Richins. The only thing the lower court could do 
with the 1980 payment of $10,431, which was dedicated 
to the Allred contract, after the dismissal of the 
defendants Richtron and Paul Richins, was to apply it to 
the contract and pay the money to the Allreds. Mr. Leo 
Richins had no claim to the money, he didn't deposit it 
into the Court, was never a party to this action, and 
the circumstances that gave rise to Mr. Leo Richins pro-
viding the Letter of Credit are immaterial. 
In regard to Richtron, Inc. ?s contention that Judge 
Cornaby did not allow Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins to 
present evidence in their defense because they had been 
dismissed from the case, the plaintiff-appellants made a 
motion at the hearing (see Tr. p. 5, lines 21-25, p. 6, 
lines 1-25, p. 7, lines 1-25 and p. 8, lines 1-13, Ex. 4, 
attached) to reinstate the parties to the lawsuit and 
have all parties present and try all the issues before the 
Court. The defendant, Paul Richins, objected to the motion 
and the Court denied the motion to reinstate all parties. 
Therefore, Paul Richins and Richtron, Inc. had an oppor-
tunity to be reinstated in the lawsuit and have all of 
the issues, including the issue of the right to control, 
heard, even after the defendants dismissed their appeal, 
and the defendants objected to being reinstated into the 
lawsuit and can't be heard to complain about not being 
able to present evidence at this time. 
4. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S ARGUMENT IV THAT NEITHER 
THE PARTNERSHIP NOR THE LIMITED PARTNERS HAVE A RIGHT 
TO THE AWARD OF THE $10,431 
I cannot follow this argument at all. The $10,431 
was the 1980 payment and should have been paid out of 
some $52,000 which was paid to the general partner in 
November or December of 1980 (see Ex. 13, attached). All 
the other payments after the action was commenced and the 
parties were restrained from interfering with the proper-
ties (see R100-101, Ex. 14, attached), and all other 
-12-
transactions involving the properties were then handled 
under the direction of the Court and the Court's ruling 
in the Partial Summary Judgment took care of any interest 
that Richtron, Inc. might have claimed in the properties. 
On page 39, the voluntary statements and allegations 
set forth in the Footnote No. 5 are not supported by the 
record in this case and the preliminary ruling in regard 
to Richtron, Inc.Ts Motion for Preliminary Injunction in 
the United States District Court Case NC 84-0131A was 
adverse to them, leaving in place the general partners 
under the other limited partnerships (see Ex. 8 and 8a, 
attached). The appellants have no knowledge of any 
United States District Court Case No. NC 83-0019W. 
For some reason, Richtron, Inc. feels that there was 
an attempt to dissolve the limited partnership and dis-
tribute the assets among the limited partners. There was 
no attempt in this action to do any such thing. The only 
attempt in this action was to get an accounting between 
the limited partnership and its retired general partner. 
Certainly there was no attempt to liquidate the limited 
partnership. The $10,431 was not cash to be distributed 
among the limited partners and does not represent a cash 
asset. It represents a real estate payment on the limited 
partnership's real estate. There is no attempt to get an 
accounting between the limited partners. The only attempt 
is to maintain the partnership's business and to maintain 
the assets and keep them from being liquidated by the 
limited partnership mortgagor and/or sellers under the 
real estate contracts. The accounting was had by the 
general partner and the limited partnership by the District 
Court in its ruling in the Partial Summary Judgment, that 
accounting being the retired general partner had no interest 
in the limited partnership properties which included the 
dedicated 1980 payment of $10,431. What accounting could 
be more positive than that? 
5. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.rS ARGUMENT V AS TO MR. 
PAUL RICHINS1 PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR THE DEBTS OF 
THE RICHTRON CORPORATION 
I fail to see where this argument has any materiality 
in this appeal. Mr. Paul Richins is not a party to this 
appeal nor is he represented in this appeal. 
6. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S ARGUMENT VI THAT THE 
$10,431 WAS DEPOSITED IN THE COURT REPRESENTING THE 
1980 PAYMENT ON THE ALLRED CONTRACT, TO BE HELD 
"PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES IN THE CONTRACT AND THE PROPERTIES UNDER-
LYING THE SAID CONTRACT" 
The properties underlying the Allred contract were 
properties of the limited partnership. The determination 
of the rights of the parties in the Allred contract was 
made by the Court's ruling in its Partial Summary Judgment 
(see Ex. MUrT, Richtron, Inc. brief). The Partial Summary 
Judgment determined that Richtron, Inc. had no right, title, 
interest or claim in the real property and the previous 
Order requiring the deposit was to be held pending the 
determination of the rights of the parties in the Allred 
contract. The deposit was dedicated as the 1980 payment 
on the Allred contract and the Court's ruling in the 
Partial Summary Judgment that Richtron, Inc. had no 
interest in that contract nor the underlying properties 
effectively ruled that Richtron, Inc. had no interest in 
the dedicated 1980 payment and the appellants agree that 
the lower court had no business .ruling that the 1980 pay-
ment belonged to Leo Richins, nor to Richtron, Inc. or 
Paul Richins, and the lower court erred in making such a 
ruling. 
7. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.fS ARGUMENT VII THAT LEO 
RICHINS DEPOSITED THE LETTER OF CREDIT ON BEHALF OF 
PAUL RICHINS AND NOT RICHTRON, INC. 
I fail to see any materiality as to why or on whose 
behalf Leo Richins deposited a Letter of Credit. The Letter 
of Credit was deposited as the 1980 payment on the Allred 
contract, which was withdrawn from the escrow agent after a 
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tender had been made. That Order, in effect, was a 
demand on the tender as a return of the 1980 payment 
which was deposited into the escrow account by Richtron, 
Inc. The return of the 1980 payment into the Court 
instead of the escrow account makes no difference from 
what source it came. It was deposited by the defen-
dants under the Richtron, Inc. tender and was dedicated 
as the 1980 payment on the Allred contract, which should 
have been paid originally by money which was provided 
to the retired general partner, Richtron, Inc., by the 
limited partnership. 
8. IN REPLY TO RICHTRON, INC.'S ARGUMENT VIII THAT THE 
$10,431 ON DEPOSIT WAS CONTRIBUTED BY, IS THE PROPERTY 
OF, AND MUST BE RETURNED TO LEO RICHINS, "THE SOURCE 
FROM WHICH IT CAMEM 
The $10,431 deposit was deposited as the 1980 payment 
and should be returned to the parties, being the appellants, 
who were required to make the 1980 payment on the Allred 
contract. The problem in this case is that we have a 
retired general partner who wants to liquidate the assets 
of the partnership, in this particular case the $10,431 
representing the 1980 Allred payment, back into the hands 
of the father of the president of the retired general 
partner, against the interests of the limited partnership, 
which interests Richtron, Inc. has a fiduciary duty to 
protect. How can Richtron, Inc. argue that they should be 
put back into the position of general partner when their 
sole desire and interest is in direct conflict with the 
interests of the limited partnership? 
In reply to Richtron, Inc.Ts argument that the money 
was not to be disbursed without a trial on the merits, what 
Richtron, Inc. has trouble seeing is that the trial on the 
merits was had by the parties stipulating settlement of the 
case in regard to the ownership of the underlying Allred 
property (see Ex. 6, attached), and the Partial Summary 
Judgment was a trial on the merits of Richtron, Inc. 
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and Paul Richins1 interests in the property, and if 
Richtron, Inc. or Paul Richins wanted to participate in 
the evidenciary hearing in regard to the issue dealing 
with the $10,431, they should have supported appellant's 
counsel's motion to reinstate those parties at the 
beginning of said evidenciary hearing (see Ex. 4, attached). 
CONCLUSION 
Richtron, Inc.fs brief, which was allowed by this 
Court to show this Court that appellant's counsel had no 
authority to represent appellant Young Farms Limited, 
expanded to attempt to show that (I) the lower court's 
Findings of Fact and Ruling and Order are not final orders 
and judgment and are not appealable; (III) Richtron, Inc. 
and Paul Richins cannot be bound by the decisions entered 
in the District Court in a case in which they are no longer 
parties; (IV) neither Young Farms Limited nor the limited 
partners have a right to an award of the $10,431 because 
there is no breach of contract, there has been no proper 
or complete accounting, and the limited partners have no 
individual interests in Richtron, Inc.rs or Young Farms 
Limitedfs assets; (V) Paul Richins is not personally liable 
for any alleged Richtron, Inc. corporate obligations; (VI) 
the $10,431 was deposited in the Court pending determination 
of the rights of the parties in the Allred contract and the 
properties, and until a "trial an the merits"; (VII) Leo 
Richins deposited the Letter of Credit on behalf of Paul 
Richins and not on behalf of Richtron, Inc.; (VIII) the 
$10,431 on deposit was contributed by and is the property 
of and must be returned to Leo Richins, "the source from 
which it came." 
The only issue that Richtron, Inc. was authorized to 
file a brief on was presented in their Argument II, appel-
lant Young Farms Limited has not been authorized to file 
or maintain this appeal and Joseph S. Knowlton 
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has not been authorized to appear in this appeal on 
behalf of Young Farms Limited, which argument covers 
lOf pages of Richtron, Inc.rs brief. The balance of 
the arguments presented in the brief propose to show 
why the 1980 payment on the Allred contract should be 
returned to the father of the president of the retired 
general partner in direct conflict to the interests of 
the limited partnership. It should be apparent that 
Richtron, Inc. should not be placed in a position of 
utilizing the assets of the limited partnership. If 
Richtron, Inc. was not sufficiently interested in the 
action to maintain it or to argue against the entry of 
the Partial Summary Judgment or to take advantage of 
a right to appear at the evidenciary hearing and to be 
reinstated in the case after the Partial Summary Judgment, 
they shouldn't be allowed to interject themselves at this 
stage of the proceedings. 
The issue about Richtron, Inc.'s right to be the 
liquidating general partner was a part of the action, 
made a part by Richtron, Inc. in their Amended Answer 
and Pre-Trial Order, and was argued and decided by the 
lower court when they denied Paul Richins' Motion to 
Deny Partial Summary Judgment and granted that Judgment. 
The Partial Summary Judgment was appealed. The appeal 
was withdrawn or the appeal was not validly made and 
thirty days have long since elapsed. 
There has to be some finality in regard to Court 
rulings and rights of parties in order for the business 
of the limited partnership to go forward, which is what 
happened at the conclusion of this action. 
DATED this /f& day of May, 1985. 
:NOWLTON 
MAILING CERTIFICATE ^_ 
I hereby certify that I have this (j day of May, 
1985, mailed true and correct copies, postage prepaid, 
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to Richtron, 
Inc.rs Brief to Leo H. Richins, Pro Se, Intervening 
Respondent, 141 East 100 South, Kaysville, Utah 84037, 
and John T. Anderson, Attorney for Defendant, Richtron, 
Inc., Hansen Jones Maycock & Leta, 50 West Broadway, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
JOSEPH S/'KNOWLTON 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
YOUNG FARMS, LIP, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RICHTRON, etal 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Date May 16. 1983 
Case No 2 9 7 Q 0 
DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Judge 
N. Davis, Reporter 
C. Long, Clerk 
This is the time set for pretrial with Joseph Knowlton, Esq. appearing 
as counsel for plaintiff. David Leta is present representing Richtron and 
Paul Richins; Paul Kunz, Esq. is present representing Bank of Utah aiid 
Jeffrey Jones is present representing the Allreds. 
Issues to be tried: Did Richtronfs resignation as a general partner 
give plaintiff the right to substitute as general partner; what property 
interest Richtron Corp. might have; did the plaintiff buy all real property 
from Goff; Who is entitled to funds from LTD Investments and Cottonwood Creek; 
on February 19, 1979 was the notice by Allred to the bank cut off interest of 
the limited partnership and whether or not they had anything to sell; did 
the bank take deed from plaintiff; should the title be in plaintiffs or' 
defendants Allreds name; does the bank have any liability after deed 
is recorded. 
All counsel present stipulate that there may be a temporary injunction 
as long as this matter is heard in the near future and that there will not be 
any disposing of property by the Allreds, and the Allreds will be bound 
by the ruling of the Court, and that the issue of the deed be dismissed. 
Court orders the matter set for trial on August 29, 31 and September 1 and 
2, 1983 at 9 a.nw 
Counsel Knowlton, Leta, Jones and Kunz concur on the trial date. 
If the trial is to be heard by jury, jury instructions must be submitted 
15 days prior to trial. Discovery to be completed 30 days prior to time of trial. 
Plaintiff to prepare pre-trial order and any exchange of names of witnesses 
to be complted 30 days prior to trial. 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
& 
YOUNG FARMS 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RICHTRON 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Date N o v e m b e r 1» 1983 
Case No. 29700 
DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Judge 
Nancy Davis, Reporter 
Kathy Potts, Clerk 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintifffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Joseph S. Knowlton is present as counsel for the plain-
tiff. Paul H. Richins is present. 
Paul Richins makes a motion to dismiss the Plaintifffs motion for 
partial summary judgment. This motion is denied. 
The court grants the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
363-3191 
Frtetf 
NOV 91981 
MICHAtt a AUPWN, Cferk 
0**Courty.Uta* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS, LIMITED, a Limited 
Partnership, et a l . , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
•vs-
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, ARAL WESLEY ALLRED, 
SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, his wife, and 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 29700 
T-33S 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Douglas 
L. Cornaby, the plaintiffs appearing by and through their attorney, Joseph S. 
Knowlton, and the defendant Paul H. Richins being represented by himself, 
defendant Bank of Utah being represented by Paul Kunz, and the defendant 
Richtron, Inc. being represented by George Handy, and after argument of counsel 
and Mr. Richins and review of the file, and good cause appearing, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Amended Complaint 
against the defendant, Paul H. Richins, is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Further, it appearing that there was no counsel present with any objection to 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against the defendant, Richtron, Inc., 
and that the documents on file herein indicate that there are no material 
facts in dispute in regard to any claim that defendant, Richtron, Inc., might 
have in regard to the interests in the properties that are the subject of this 
action, it is herewith determined that Richtron, Inc. has no right, title or 
interest or claim to or in the real property which is the subject matter of 
this suit, described on the attached Exhibit "A", and the defendant, 
Richtron, Inc., is herewith dismissed out of this case. 
DATED this 9 day of November, 1983. 
By the Court: 
(P'frTt^ 
^ j o m ^ ^ * 
MAILING CERTIFICATE^ 
I hereby certify that I have this j day of November, 1983, mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Partial Summary Judgment, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
David E. Leta & John T. Anderson 
Hansen Jones Maycock & Leta 
12th Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeffrey Jones 
110 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul T. Kunz 
2650 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
George B. Handy 
2650 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
John Sampson 
2650 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Paul H. Richins 
37 N. Maiji 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
KXUIIlfT MAlf 
KUKSTON PIJOPKRTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range t West, U.S .M. 
Sec lion 5: Beginning at the southeast corner of tin* northeast quarter of the 
southwest charter; thenee North 103 fool; thence West f»(iG.r» feet; thence 
South 20°00$ Kast -II3.57 feet; thenee Kast ISO u*ot In point of beginning. 
Section 5; The South half of the Southwest quarter, 
Excepting therefrom the following described properly: Beginning 
at a point 51.28 feet North 0° (M' H" Kast along the N-S 1/4 Section 
line from the S 1/4 corner of said Section; thenee North 20° 17' 11" 
West 1 ,308.45 feet; thenee South su11 5.V 37" Kast I7G.04 feet; thenee 
South 0° OP 14M Kast t .2H2.K9 leet b> point oi beginning. Contains 
7,OOi) acres . 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M. 
Section S; The northwest quarter; southwest quarter of the northeast quarter; 
South half of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter. Beginning at the 
center; thenee South 990 feet; thence South 20° W Kast 1 ,157.3 feet; thence 
North 75° 95? Kast G42 feet; thence South 20° 35' Kast C.70 feet to the South 
Section line; thenee Kast 415 feet; thence North 300 feet; thence Kast 300 feet; 
thence North 1,020 feet; thenee West 1,320 feet; thenee North 1,320 feet; 
thence West 1,320 feet to point of beginning. \.vsx 17 acres deeded to -Utah 
Power & Light Co.
 r and 8 acres for State Road. 
Together with 103 shares of Dry Gulch Irrigation Co. water, 40 shares of 
Indian water, 30 shares of high water, and a 2 second feet continuous flow 
water filling (1913) and all or any shares owned by Sellers contingent to this 
property. Excepting and reserving all o i l , gas and mineral rights. 
DORA J . FRKSTON PROPKRTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, U .S .M. 
Section 8: 
Beginning at a point 170.40 feet South 0° 01 • 12" West along the N-S 1/4 Section 
ling from the North 1/4 Comer said Section; thenee South 20° 23' 54,f Kast 
510.284 feet; thenee South 88° 04* 09M West 178.197 feet; thenee North 0C> 011 42" 
Kast 484.285 feet to point of beginning. Contains 0.990 acre . 
ALLRKl) PROPKRTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, Uintah Special Meridian 
Section 4: The west half of the northwest quarter; the southwest quarter. 
Section 5: The northeast quarter; the north half of the southeast quarter* 
Together with any and all Improvements thereunto, and 392 shares of Dry Gulch 
High Water Stock. 
Excluding and reserving, therefrom, all oi l , gas and other minerals. 
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Q And after you disbursed it to your attorney there 
A was no money in your bank account to pay the 1980 payment to 
the Allreds if they were to ask for it, was there? 
A No, 
THE COURT: Let me ask a question. When you say 
the payments to your attorney, I know there was reference made 
earlier. Does that mean to pay an attorney fee? 
t I THE WITNESS: Yes. 
) \ THE COURT: Okay. It doesn't mean holding it in 
Oj trust for some other reason? 
l\ THE WITNESS: No. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 (Question by Mr. Knowlton) 
4 Q So, when you said in your letter, we are hereby 
3 tendering you $10,431, there was no funds to make that tender 
3) good, was there? 
7 A No. 
8 Q And if in fact it was called upon, how were you going} 
91 to pay it.? 
0 A We would have probably—First place, I would have 
1 went probably to my folks. 
21 Q No further questions. Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. You 
4 can call your next witness. 
5 MR. KNOWLTON: Maybe we can stipulate in regard to 
71 
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he now then out of the case or with the withdrawal of the 
peal does he have standing in the case? Where do we stand 
regard to that? Are we going to go forward with this hear-
j as a party? Are we going to reinstate him as a party, or 
* do we proceed? 
THE COURT: Let me say that I am not going to do 
fthing except rule as counsel asks me to rule. I am not 
Lng to do anything except rule. If you ask me how he stands 
the time, I suppose he stands as not a party to the action 
jht now. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well — 
THE COURT: He has dismissed his appeal. 
MR. KNOWLTON: He filed several subpoenas. He has 
spared—I believe he has asked—I don't see him yet but he 
>uld be here—The president of Tyler Realty Company to appear 
:h voluminous records to present to the court and like I say, 
im not interested in proceeding in that manner on the whole 
sue, the whole framework. 
THE COURT: We are not going to hear the whole thing, 
are only here to decide who the $10,431 belongs to. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Well, all right. Now, I would like 
get to that, if we get to that, are we going to have Mr. 
:hins here as a party representing himself as a party making 
ruments,asking questions, etc., as we go down the line, 
:ause I am going to make the objections and I know that he 
5 
t| is not a party and has no standing and I am here to present ! 
gj evidence in .regard to that sole issue and I don't believe it 
3 is going to be fair for him not to be able to cross examination 
4 or what have you, but if he is going to do this he ought to 
3 be a party. If we are going to reinstate him as a party then 
g we ought to do away with Your Honor's order that you made, 
7 that ex-parte order, and then have him here and have the 
8 hearing with all parties here and get the thing disposed of 
9 in whole and in total and have this money disbursed in regard 
10 to everybody that is a party, 
11 THE COURT: I understand what you are saying. 
12 MR. KNOWLTON: Well, I will make that motion. I 
13 will make the motion that we reinstate him as a part-y and 
14 withdraw my motion for a dismissal against him. Reinstate onr-
13 selves the way we were and have Your Honor withdraw the order 
18 that you made, the ruling that you made on the basis of his 
17 ex-parte petition which I have never seen, and then request 
*8 a trial date for the whole issue to be determined, whether or 
19 not this payment belongs to the Allreds, whether Allred's con-
*Q\ tract is in force and effect and whether or not the plaintiffs 
2
* are the sole buyers under that contract and what interests Mr. 
2 2
 Richins has in any aspect of the lawsuit; the money, the 
ox 
*
w
 contract or anything otherwise. I will make the motion. 
2 4
 THE COURT: Okay. 
23
 MR. RICHINS: Your Honor, I would object to that 
6 
• motion. The partial summary judgment was entered on November 
2 9th of 1983. Mr* Knowlton—This was the result of a motion that 
* Mr. Knowlton had made for a partial summary judgment. The 
^ Court had previously ordered myself, Paul H. Richins, to deposit! 
jj $10,431 into the Court's trust account. As the evidence will 
g show today, that money was provided by Leo H. Richins. The 
j case has been dismissed against myself as a person. It has 
g also been dismissed against RICHTRON, INC. The question before 
9 this court is the issue, as both the Court and counsel agrees, 
10 is who owns the money now that the case is dismissed . 
H I would propose that certainly this issue has to be resolved 
12 as the Court has so ordered, for there would come, of course, 
13 be the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment, but Leo H. Richins has 
14 put money in somewhere and got absolutely no benefit whatsoever 
15 The amended complaint that plaintiffs filed on the defendant^ 
18 RICHTRON, INC. and Paul Richins have been dismissed. Every 
17 cause of action in the complaint has been dismissed. I dis-
18 tinctly remember Mr. Knowlton representing to the Court as part 
19 of the reason why the Court should dismiss RICHTRON, INC. and 
20 Paul Richins out of this case is because he had worked out an 
21 arrangement with the Allreds for some kind of a payment, 
22 apparently, outside of the Court here to take care of them and 
23 I would object to his motion that I should be brought back into 
24 the lawsuit and that he was the one that initiated it and the 
25 judgment was never appealed by Mr. Knowlton to have it set aside! 
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and the way it is right now RICHTRON, INC. is dismissed and 
(.Paul Richins is dismissed. There is $10,000 that was put into 
the Court on behalf of Paul Richins, as the evidence will show, 
and-that really is the only issue before the Court so I would 
object to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. In ruling on the motion, the 
record can show that plaintiff made a motion to reinstate Mr. 
Richins so he is part of the lawsuit or not permit him to 
participate in this hearing today and the defendant objects 
to be made part of the hearing and so, the Court will sustain 
both the objection that Mr. Richins has to be made party again 
and grant the motion that you are making. You will be the sole 
one producing your evidence today. Call your first witness. 
MR. KNOWLTON: Mr. Paul Richins. 
THE COURT: Be sworn. 
MR. RICHINS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I am a layman 
I didn't quite understand what you just said. 
THE COURT: He is going to present his evidence and 
that's all there is going to be before the Court. You won't 
have any opportunity to participate except as a witness. 
Apparently, he is going to call you as a witness. 
i-IR. RICHINS: Okay. 
PAUL H. RICHINS, 
<-alled as a witness for the plaintiff, having first been duly 
sworn to tell the truth, the who! P ^ruth and notnina but the 
8 
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JOSEPH s . KNOWLTON FILED IM CLERK'S OFFICE 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f OAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
845 East 400 South
 llwlf l i m _ tM - l#% 
Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102 1384 MAR 2 9 AH S 18 
3 6 3 - 3 1 9 1
 MICHAEL G.ALLPHIH. CLERK 
2MB DISTRICT COURT 
TTfl 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS C 
STATE OF UTAH 
»
Y CLER
* 
YOUNG FARMS, LIMITED, a limited ) 
partnership, et al. 
•vs-
) ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT 
Plaintiffs, AGREEMENT AND OF DISMISSAL 
) 
) 
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, ARAL WESLEY ALLRED, ) 
SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, his wife, BANK OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation, ) Civil No. 29700 
Defendants. ) 
Based upon the Settlement Agreement executed by Plaintiffs and 
Defendants, Aral Wesley Al1 red and Sarah Elaine All red, in the above-described 
matter, and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement 
executed by Plaintiffs and Defendants, Aral Wesley All red and Sarah Elaine 
All red, in the above-described action, dated March 28, 1984, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A11 and made a part hereof, are approved. 
FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff's right to appeal the Court!s previous 
rulings dated the 11th day of January, 1984 and the 1st day of February, 1984 and 
preserved by their Notice of Intention to Appeal dated the 30th day of January, 
1984 and the 6th day of February, 1984 is recognized and that right to appeal its 
orders previously given by the Court commences from the date of this order. 
FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court is to return to the 
Plaintiffs all of the funds deposited by the plaintiff in the clerk's office 
representing the 1981 and 1982 payments on the contracts in litigation in this 
action, it being understood that the monies representing the 1980 payment 
deposited by the prior defendant, Richins, are to be retained by the clerk 
until the conclusion of plaintiff's appeal. 
FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff!s Amended Complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice and on its merits as to Defendants, Aral Wesley Al1 red and 
Sarah Elaine Al1 red. 
DATED this JL? day of March, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tab 6 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants Aral W. 
Al l red and Sarah E. Al l red 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
BlfcHMt29 H I * ' 8 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS, LIMITED, a limited 
par tnersh ip , et a/. 
Plaint i f fs, 
vs. 
RICHTRON, INC. , a Utah corporat ion, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, ARAL WESLEY 
ALLRED, SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, 
his wi fe , BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporat ion, 
Defendants. 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 29700 
Plaintiffs Young Farms, Limited, a Utah limited par tnersh ip , and 
Phil l ip O. Boyer, V i rg i l Condon, Boyd J . Farr , Homer L. Hale, Mane M. I rv ine , 
G. Kenneth Johnson, Kenneth W. Jones, Robert C. Newman, Toff ie Saway, 
Richard Stover, William T ingey, James E. Watts, and Ralph M. Wr ight , the 
Limited Partners (hereinafter collectively "P la in t i f f s " ) , and Defendants, Aral 
Wesley Al l red and Sarah Elaine Al l red (hereinafter collectively " A l l r e d s " ) , by 
and through thei r respective counsel, whose signatures appear below, hereby 
represent to the Court that they have reached a settlement of all disputed 
issues between said parties in the above matter upon the fol lowing terms and 
condit ions: 
1. On or before March 3 1 , 1984, Plaintiffs witf pay Allreds the 
following amounts, representing annual installment payments due Allreds under 
the terms of a Memorandum of Agreement between Allreds and Robert M. Young 
and Betty Jean Young (hereinafter collectively ?fYoungs") dated November 21 , 
1974, the obligations of which were assumed by Richtron, Inc. , a Utah 
corporation, under the terms of an Agreement between Allreds, Youngs and 
Richtron, Inc. dated February 19, 1979 (said Memorandum of Agreement and 
said Agreement are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Agreements") , 
with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent (7°o) per annum from the 
respective dates set forth below until paid: 
Amount Date 
$10,430.49 November 16, 1980 
$10,430.49 November \G, 1981 
$10,430.49 November 16, 1982 
$10,430.49 November 16, 1983 
2. On or before March 31^ 1984, Plaintiffs wHI~ pay Alfred the 
following amounts, representing property taxes assessed by the County 
Assessor of Duchesne County, State of Utah, for the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, 
with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum from and 
after the respective dates set forth below until paid: 
Amount Date 
S 916.23 December 3 1 , 1981 
$ 941.02 December 31 , 1982 
$1,176.15 December 3 1 , 1983 
3. On or before March 3 1 , 1984, Plaintiffs will pay Allreds the 
following amounts, representing annual assessments of the Dry Gulch Irrigation 
Company for the years 1980, 19811 1982 and 198?, with interest thereon at the 
-*>• 
rate of seven percent (7°d) per annum from the respective dates set for th below 
untii pa id: 
Amount Date 
$196.90 December 3 1 , 1980 
$196.90 December 3 1 , 1981 
$196.00 December 3 1 , 1982 
$196.00 December 3 1 , 1983 
€ 4. On^QA^efore March 3 1 , 1984, Plaintiffs will pay Alfreds the sum 
of 9te-QQQ7Q$rs%$ partial payment of Alfreds attorneys fees incurred here in . 
Except as set forth in this Paragraph 4 , each of the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
shall bear his, hers , or its own costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred 
here in . 
5 . The principal balance due under the Agreements shall be 
$78,214.84 as of March 3 1 , 1984, and af ter credit ing the payment amounts 
described in Paragraph 1 , above. Plaintiffs hereby agree to pay Al lreds said 
principal balance, with interest thereon from November 17, 1983, through March 
3 1 , 1984, at the rate of seven percent (7%)*per annum and from Apri l 1 , 1984 
until paid at the rate of twelve percent (12°o) per annum, in annual installments 
as follows: 
(a) $11,726.14 due on November 16, 1984; and 
(b) $13,172.58 due on November 16, 1985, and on each 
succeeding November 16th thereafter until the balance of 
principal and interest described herein is paid in fu l l . 
6. The parties hereto agree to create and establish an escrow 
account at Zions First National Bank, 1 South Main Street , Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 
(hereinafter "Escrow A g e n t " ) , for the purposes of this Settlement Agreement. 
Plaintiffs agree that all payments described in Paragraph 5, above, shall be 
made into said escrow account for disbursement to Allreds upon receipt . The 
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parties hereto f u r t h e r agree that the following documents shall be placed in 
escrow with said Escrow Agent : 
(a ) A copy of this Settlement Agreement; and 
( b ) An or ig inal , unrecorded Warranty Deed conveying the real 
property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by 
this reference incorporated here in , from Al l reds, as 
Grantors , to Plaint i f fs, as Grantees. Said real property 
is sometimes hereinafter re fer red to as the "Proper ty . " 
Upon payment in full of the ent i re amount of principal and accrued interest 
described in Paragraph 5, above, the Escrow Agent shall release said Warranty 
Deed to Plaintiffs. 
7. Plaintiffs hereby agree to pay all taxes and assessments of v e r y 
kind which become due upon the Proper ty , including any assessments from the 
Dry Gulch I rr igat ion Company dur ing the term of this Settlement Agreement and 
thereaf ter . 
8 . Should Plaintiffs fail to comply with any of the terms hereof, 
Al lreds shall give Plaintiffs wr i t ten notice specifically setting for th the 
provisions under which Plaintiffs are in defaul t . Should Plaintiffs fail to cure 
such default within sixty (60) days therea f te r , Allreds may, in addition to any 
other remedies afforded Allreds by law, be released from all obligations in law 
and equity to convey the Property to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs shall become at 
once a tenant at will of Al l reds. All payments which have been made by 
Plaintiffs theretofore under this Settlement Agreement or the Agreements shall 
be retained by Allreds as liquidated and agreed damages for breach of this 
Settlement Agreement. 
9 . Plainti f fs, and each of them, hereby release, acquit , discharge 
and agree to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Al l reds, the i r respective 
agents, representat ives, successors and assigns and each of them, of and from 
any and all obligations, claims, counterclaims, debts , demands, covenants, 
contracts,, promises, agreements, naDinties, actions ana/or causes or action 
whatsoever that Plaintiffs, or any of them, ever had, now have or may in the 
future have concerning, relating to or based in whole or in part upon this 
action and the facts alleged in this action or based in whole or in part upon any 
claim relating to the Agreements or the Property, and specifically including any 
claims or actions of Richtron, Inc. 
10- Plaintiffs, and each of them, hereby warrant to Allreds that they 
have not, prior to the execution and delivery of this Settlement Agreement, 
assigned or transferred to any person or party any of the claims released 
herein, 
11. Allreds, and each of them, hereby release Plaintiffs from any 
default, if any, resulting from Plaintiffs' failure to make payments under the 
terms of the Agreements. 
12. The parties hereto agree that the Amended Complaint of 
Plaintiffs may be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits as against 
Allreds. 
13. Nothing contained herein sha l^ be deemed to be a waiver, release 
or discharge of Plaintiffs' rights under that certain Notice of Appeal dated 
February 1 , 1984, filed herein, or to the facts or circumstances out of which it 
arose. 
14. If any term or provision of this Settlement Agreement, including 
the Warranty Deed or Agreements or the application thereof to any person, 
property or circumstance, shall to any extent be invalid or unenforceable, the 
remainder of this Settlement Agreement and said Warranty Deed and 
Agreements, or the application of such term or provision to persons, property 
or circumstances other than those as to which it is invalid and unenforceable, 
shaH not be affected thereby, and each term and provision of this Settlement 
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Agreement and said Warranty Deed and Agreements shall be valid and enforced 
to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
15. This Settlement Agreement, including the Warranty Deed and 
Agreements, contains the entire understanding of the parties hereto with 
respect to the subject matter contained herein and may be amended only by a 
written instrument executed by all Plaintiffs and Allreds or their respective 
successors or assigns. There are no restrictions, promises, warranties, 
covenants, or undertakings other than those expressly set forth herein. 
16. This Settlement Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be 
binding upon the Plaintiffs and Allreds and their respective successors but shall 
not inure to the benefit of anyone other than the parties signatory to this 
Settlement Agreement and their respective successors. 
17. AH representations, warranties, agreements and other 
inducements to this Settlement Agreement or the transactions contemplated 
hereby, whether oral or written, prior to the execution and delivery hereof, 
have been included herein, or in the Warranty Deed and Agreements, and shall 
be deemed to have been fully performed and discharged to the extent not 
included herein or therein. This Settlement Agreement and the Warranty Deed 
and Agreements set forth ail rights, remedies, obligations and liabilities of the 
parties, and no terms and provisions hereof or thereof, including, without 
limitation, the terms and provisions contained in this sentence, shall be waived, 
modified or altered so as to impose any additional obligation or liability or grant 
any additional right or remedy, and no custom, payment, act, knowledge, 
extension of time, favor or indulgence, gratuitous or otherwise, or words or 
silence at any time, shall impose any additional obligation or liability or grant 
any additional right or remedy or be deemed a waiver or release of any 
obligation, liability, right or remedy except as set forth in a written instrument 
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properly executed and delivered by the party sought to be charged, expressly 
stating that it is, and to the extent to which it is, intended to be so effective. 
No assent, express or implied, by any party, or waiver by any party, to or of, 
any breach of any term or provision of this Settlement Agreement shall be 
deemed to be an assent or waiver to or of such or any succeeding breach of the 
same or any other such term or provision. 
18- This Settlement Agreement shall be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
19. Should either party default in any of the covenants and terms 
hereof or of the Agreements, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may be incurred as a 
result of such default. 
20- Each of the undersigned warrants that he is authorized to 
execute this Settlement Agreement for and on behalf of his respective clients. 
ACCORDINGLY, Plaintiffs and AHreds, by and through their 
respective counsel of record, jointly stipulate and agree to the above terms and 
conditions and move for an Order of this Court approving the terms hereof and 
for dismissal with prejudice and on the merits of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
against Alireds pursuant hereto. 
DATED this 7 # day of March, 1984. 
NIELSEN & S 
idants Aral W. 
Alfred an3 Sarah E\ Allred 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
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oseph S. Knowlton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
845 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-3191 
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David E. Leta 
ROE AND FOWLER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
F I L E D 
MAR 24 1982 
RODNEY W. WALKER, C\*k 
Davis County. Utah 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLACKFOOT FARMS, BURLEY FARMS, 
CATLOW VALLEY FARMS #1, CATLOW 
VALLEY FARMS #2, CATLOW VALLEY 
FARMS #3, CATLOW VALLEY FARMS #4, 
CATLOW VALLEY FARMS #5, CATLOW 
VALLEY FARMS #6, CATLOW VALLEY 
FARMS #7, EAST TABER PROPERTIES. 
KANOSH FARMS, MORELAND 
PROPERTIES, NORTH BEAR LAKE 
FARMS, NORTH TABER PROPERTIES. 
PLEASANT VALLEY FARMS, RANDLETT 
INVESTERS, LTD., RICHFIELD FARMS, 
RICHTRON A-10. LTD., RICHTRON 
A-13, LTD., RICHTRON B-10, LTD., 
SHOSHONE FARMS, SPRINGFIELD 
PROPERTIES, TABER PROPERTIES, 
WEST TABER PROPERTIES, WIXOM 
PROPERTIES, and YOUNG FARMS, all 
Utah limited partnerships, 
Plaintiffs, 
RICHTRON FINANCIAL, a Utah 
corporation, RICHTRON GENERAL, a 
Utah corporation, RICHTRON, INC., a 
Utah corporation, FRONTIER 
AMERICAN, a Utah corporation, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, an individual, 
SHARI L. RICHINS, an individual, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, dba RICHTRON 
AG-LAND INDUSTRIES, RICHTRON 
GENERAL, a Utah corporation, dba 
RICHTRON AG-LAND INDUSTRIES, 
LEO H. RICHINS, an individual, and 
MRS. LEO H. RICHINS, an individual, 
LEO H. RICHINS and MRS. LEO H. 
RICHINS, dba LEO H. RICHINS 
FAMILY TRUST, JOHN DOES 1 through 
100, and CORPORATION JOHN DOES 1 
through 100, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
ORDER REQUIRING COUNSEL 
TO SHOW PROOF 
OF AUTHORITY 
Civil No. 2-30994 
Defendants. 
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Defendants move the court pursuant to § 78-51-33, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), for an order requiring plaintiffs' counsel, James R. 
Brown, Esq., to show proof of authority for his appearance on behalf 
of the plaintiffs and staying all further proceedings in this action 
pending the production of such proof to the court. In support of said 
motion defendants represent as follows: 
1. Two of the named defendants, Richtron, Inc., and Richtron 
General, are the retired general partners of all of the plaintiff limited 
partnerships and are authorized by law to wind-up the business of the 
limited partnerships. Neither of these defendants has authorized 
plaintiffs' counsel herein to represent the limited partnerships in this 
matter. 
2. Some of the limited partnership plaintiffs, such as Young 
Farms, Ltd., are involved in other litigation with some of the 
defendants and are represented by other counsel in those matters. It is 
defendants belief that such plaintiffs have not authorized James R. 
Brown to represent them in this action. 
3. Some of the limited partnerships, such as Burley Farms, 
Randlett Investors, Ltd. and Springfield Properties, have entered into 
negotiations of accord and satisfaction with some or all of the 
defendants and, therefore, defendants believe that said plaintiffs do not 
desire to participate in, nor be represented by, Mr. Brown in this 
matter. 
4. Some of the limited partnerships, such as Shoshone Farms, 
Ltd., are debtors under Chapter 7 of Title 11, U.S.C. in the United 
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States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah and are represented 
by trustees who have not authorized Mr. Brown to represent them in 
this action. 
5. Mr. Brown represents Utah Production Credit Association 
(P .C .A. ) which has filed an action against the individual partners of 
Randlett Investors, Ltd., a plaintiff herein. Mr. Brown cannot 
represent both parties without a serious conflict of interest. 
6. The affidavit of Paul Richins is submitted in further support 
of this motion. 
WHEREFORE, defendants seek an order requiring plaintiffs counsel 
to show proof of his authority for appearance in this matter on behalf 
of each and every plaintiff named in this case; a further order staying 
all proceedings regarding this matter pending the production of such 
proof to the court; and such other relief as the court deems just and 
proper. 
!0^day of DATED this £v- d  i March, 198 
David E. Let a 
Robert D. Rose 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
3 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thew2cX*l*day of March, 1982, I 
served the foregoing Defendant's Motion for Order Requiring 
Counsel to Show Proof of Authority upon James R. Brown, Esq., 
attorney for plaintiff, by depositing a copy thereof in 
the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
James R. Brown, Esq. 
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
370 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C**w*w nu*u* 
97g 
David E. Leta 
John T. Anderson 
ROE AND FOWLER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLACKFOOT FARMS, e t c . , et a l , , ) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
VS. ) 
PAUL H. RICHINS, RICHTRON, INC., ) 
and RICHTRON FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, e t c . , et al. y-
Defendants. ) Civil No. 2-30994 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Respecting Defendants' 
Authority to Liquidate, Wind Up and Terminate the Affairs of the Plaintiff 
Limited Partnerships and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiffs' 
Counsel's Failure to Show Proof of Authority having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge presiding, on 
November 19, 1982, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., and the court having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein; the court hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. That the herein action, including nil claims for relief set forth 
in plaintiffs complaint are hereby dismissed without prejudice. Said dismissal 
shall not affect the ability, if any, of plaintiffs1 purported representative, 
John P. Sampson and his agents, employees, representatives and/or nominees 
to remedy their failure to comply with Utah lmv in the attempted substitution 
of their entities, John P. Sampson, a Professional Corporation, or Ag 
Management, Inc . , as successor general partner of the plaintiff limited 
partnerships. 
1107 2-1 u:-
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2. Each party shall bear its own costs incurred herein, provide 
however, that nothing contained herein shall limit or affect defendant 
rights, if any, to obtain costs , expenses and attorneys1 fees necessarily 
reasonably incurred in connection with defendants' efforts to compel 
production of documents and other discovery from plaintiffs during 
pendency of this action. 
DATED this 7^f day of November, 1982. 
/Distridt %dge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^W d a v °f November, 1982, 
foregoing Order upon James R. Brown, attorney for plaintiffs, 
a copy thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid 
follows: 
James R. Brown, Esq. 
JARDINE,, LINBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, #401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
, THH UNOERSIG* 
,'OUBT OF OAVJS 
C E R T IFV THAT T H * 
A TRUE AND FL'L 
MENT ON FILE h>» 
WITNESS MN 
THISJ^OAY -
d the 
ositing 
jsed as 
3F
 NTHE DISTRICT 
TAM T H E R E B Y 
ND FOREGOING IS 
, ft C/filCTNAL DOCU-
~P .6 SU r H CLERK 
OF SAID OFFICE 
£ . 1 8 ^ 
P H H M . C L E R K 
"V. ' / ? ' 
<f 
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John T. Anderson, Esq., Utah State Bar No. 94 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <Jc LETA 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Suite 600, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
-ooOoo-
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
RICHTRON GENERAL, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON FINAN-
CIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; FRONTIER 
EQUITIES, a Utah corpora-
tion; FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, 
a Utah corporation; LEO H. 
RICHINS FAMILY REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an unincorporated 
association; BLACKFOOT 
FARMS, a Utah limited part-
nership; BURLEY FARMS, a Utah 
limited partnership; CATLOW 
VALLEY FARMS NOS. 1-7, a 
series of Utah limited 
partnerships; KANOSH FARMS, 
a Utah limited partnership; 
MORELAND PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership; NORTH 
BEAR LAKE FARMS, a Utah 
limited partnership; RANDLETT 
INVESTORS, a Utah limited 
partnership; RICHFIELD FARMS, 
a Utah limited partnership; 
SHOSHONE FARMS, a Utah 
limited partnership; TABER 
PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership; EAST TABER 
PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership; WEST TABER 
PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership; NORTH TABER 
PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership; WIXOM 
PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership; YOUNG FARMS, 
LTD., a Utah limited partner-
ship; PLEASANT VALLEY FARMS, 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
CivilNo.NC84-0131A 
a Utah limited partnership? 
RICHTRON A-13, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; 
RICHTRON B-10, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; and, 
SPRINGFIELD PROPERTIES, a 
Utah limited partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN P. SAMPSON; JOHN P. 
SAMPSON, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; 
KEITH P. BLANCHE; MILTON R. 
GOFF; REX KOHLER; J. KIRK 
MOYES; DON DEE OLSEN; 
HENRY A. TOTZKE; RALPH M. 
WRIGHT, SR.; BART WOLTHIUS, 
SR.; MARILYN E. BROWN; 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, d/b/a 
SAMPSON & LYON; PEARL 
BLANCHE; BARBARA SAMPSON; 
AG-MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation; WESTERN FARMERS, 
a Utah general partnership; 
CONSOLIDATED FARMS, a Utah 
general partnership; G & K 
PROPERTIES, a Utah general 
partnership; 0 & M PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, INC., a Utah 
corporation? O & M PLUMBING 
AND HEATING COMPANY PENSION 
PLAN, an unincorporated 
association; O & M PLUMBING 
AND HEATING COMPANY PROFIT 
SHARING PLAN, an unincor-
porated association; OGDEN 
DENTAL GROUP TRUST NO. 5, an 
unincorporated association; 
SNOWVILLE INVESTORS, LTD., 
a Utah general partnership; 
YOUNG FARMS, a Utah general 
partnership; TOWER REAL 
ESTATE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; KENNETH ELTINGE; 
DAVID WOODS, SR.; DAVID 
WOODS, JR.; DANNY WOODS; 
and JOHN DOES 1-30, 
Defendants. 
(j) Totzke* 
(1) On information and belief, Totzke had full knowledge of, 
consented to, and participated in all conduct described in paragraphs 
29(a), (b) and (c). 
(2) Totzke knew that all monies and assets collected by 
Sampson rightfully belonged to, or were owned by, plaintiffs and knew 
that all such assets would be reinvested in an enterprise whose sole 
purpose was to seize and maintain control of the Richtron Affiliates, 
RFC, Frontier Equities, Richins and the Limited Partnerships. 
(3) Between at least December 2, 1980, and November 24, 
1982, Totzke assisted Sampson in soliciting from each limited partner 
of each of the Limited Partnerships all or a portion of the Proxy 
Documents described in paragraph 32(a) below. 
(k) Wright, Eltinge and Tower. 
(1) Between approximately January, 1981 and the present, 
Wright, Eltinge and Tower have engaged in numerous transactions to 
effect termination of all of the Richtron Affiliates' right, title and 
interest in and to certain real property formerly owned by the Young 
* 
Farms, Ltd. limited partnership ("Young Farms") and to obtain that 
interest for themselves. 
(2) Pursuant to that scheme, Wright, Eltinge and Tower have 
executed numerous instruments and other documents, the exact 
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Identity and description of which are not now known to plaintiffs, for 
the purpose of transferring and conveying Young FarmsJ right, title 
and interest in and to the real property to various third persons whose 
precise identity is not now known to plaintiffs, and thereby 
eliminating any right, title or interest of the Richtron Affiliates in 
that property. 
(3) Pursuant to a series of letters dated June 4, 1980, 
February 5, 1981, February 16, 1981, March 4, 1981, March 16, 1981, 
April 17, 1981, May 2, 1981, May 7, 1981, May 8, 1981, May 14, 1981, 
May 21, 1981, May 24, 1981, August 14, 1981, September 22, 1981, 
October 23, 1981, November 12, 1981, January 6, 1982, January 14, 
1982 and January 15, 1982, Wright and El tinge represented to each of 
the limited partners of the Young Farms, Ltd. limited partnership, 
debtors and/or creditors of the Richtron Affiliates and the Limited 
Partnerships that: 
(i) Richtron, Inc. had been legally removed 
under Utah law as general partner of Young Farms, Ltd., 
and no longer a member thereof; 
(ii) Eltinge, d/b/a Tower Real Estate, Inc., had 
been legally admitted under Utah law to Young Farms, 
Ltd., as substitute sole general partner and member 
thereof; 
(iii) no amendment to Young Farms, Ltd.?s 
certificate required the signature of Richtron, Inc. to 
remove Richtron, Inc. from Young Farms, Ltd. and as 
general partner thereof and admit Eltinge as a member 
and substitute general partner; 
(iv) Richtron, Inc. had breached a fiduciary 
duty; 
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(v) Richtron, Inc. had mismanaged Young 
Farms, Ltd. and its properties to such an extent that 
removal of Richtron, Inc. as general partner was 
necessary to rescue the limited partners' investments 
from total destruction; 
(vi) Richtron, Inc. and Richins were unlawfully 
and unethically exploiting the limited partners1 interests 
and were enemies of them; 
(vii) Richtron, Inc. had misappropriated 
partnership funds; 
(viii) Richins was dishonest and used sharp 
business practices in formation and management of 
Young Farms, Ltd.; 
(ix) Richtron, Inc. had no legal right to 
liquidate, wind-up and terminate Young Farms, Ltd.; 
(x) EltingeTs and Wright's actions were in the 
best interests of the limited partners; 
(xi) the limited partners would lose their entire 
investment unless Richtron, Inc. was removed as general 
partner; 
(xii) the limited partners could be made whole 
and recover their investments by supporting El tinge and 
Wright and substituting El tinge as general partner; 
(xiii) El tinge and Wright had legal authority to 
call partnership meetings and conduct partnership 
business; 
(xiv) El tinge had legal authority to assess the 
limited partners and power to remove or dilute or 
otherwise default any limited partner who refused to pay 
assessments to him; 
(xv) El tinge had legal authority to deal in the 
assets and liabilities of Richtron, Inc. and Young Farms, 
Ltd. and with their debtors and creditors; and, 
(xvi) El tinge had legal authority to sell and 
collect the proceeds from the property and collect 
money from debtors of Young Farms, Ltd. 
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(4) On July 1, 1981, Wright, Eltinge, Tower and Young Farms, 
filed with the Office of the Davis County Clerk, Utah, a document 
entitled "Amended Articles, Limited Partnership Agreement of Young 
Farms, Ltd.11 (the "Substitution Document"). The Substitution 
Document purported to expel Richtron, Inc., as general partner of 
plaintiff, Young Farms, Ltd., and admit Tower as substitute general 
partner. The Substitution Document was and is invalid and of no 
effect since it failed to contain the signature of the general partner 
sought to be substituted as required by § 48-2-25(l)(b), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). 
(5) In purported reliance on the Substitution Document, 
Eltinge, Tower, Wright and Young Farms executed, acknowledged, 
delivered, received and in some cases filed and recorded in public 
offices, deeds, real estate contracts, notices, checks, and other 
instruments for the purpose of conveying and otherwise transferring, 
in derogation of plaintiffs' title, certain real and personal property of 
the Limited Partnerships. 
30. Each of the acts described in paragraphs 28 and 29 above, was 
undertaken in, or effected through, interstate commerce. 
31. Beginning in about December, 1980, and continuing to the present, 
Sampson and the Sampson Group sought to solicit and in fact solicited from all the 
limited partners of the Limited Partnerships participation in an investment 
package ('Investment Package"). 
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47. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c), plaintiffs are entitled to an award of 
damages in an amount equal to three (3) times the amount of sustained damages, 
together with all costs of suit and a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
48. The conduct of Sampson, the Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, 
Eltinge, Tower and John Does 1-30 has been actuated by malice, bad faith and 
extreme ill will, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages in the 
amount of $5,000,000.00. 
49. Plaintiffs' discovery of the conduct described in paragraphs 28 and 29 
above, and of the falsity of the representations described in paragraph 39 above, 
did not occur, and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have 
occurred, until between January and November, 1982, since defendants actively 
concealed facts which, if disclosed, may have alerted plaintiffs of the existence of 
cognizable claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., 15 U.S.C. § 78-j and 15 U.S.C. § 
77-g. In addition, between December, 1982 and May, 1984, plaintiffs were 
absolutely precluded by court order from instituting or maintaining claims of the 
type at issue in this proceeding. The applicable statutes of limitation are 
accordingly tolled for the total duration of that disability. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Injunctive Relief Against Racketeering 
Activity Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)) 
50* Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 
51. Unless Sampson, the Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge, 
Tower and their agents, representatives, nominees and/or employees are 
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preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained from: (a) engaging in the 
activities described in paragraphs 28, 29 and 39 above; and, (b) retaining any 
interest, direct or indirect, in the enterprise represented by such conduct, 
plaintiffs will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury and harm for 
which there is not, or may not, be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, 
52. Plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to the issuance of a preliminary and 
permanent injunction enjoining and restraining Sampson, the Sampson Group, the 
Sampson Partners, Eltinge, Tower and their agents, representatives, nominees 
and/or employees from performing any such activities, ordering divestiture of any 
interest in their racketeering enterprises, and dissolving any and all such 
enterprises, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a). 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Relief Under Section 10 of the Securities 
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5) 
53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 52 above. 
54. The Investment Package offered and sold by Sampson and the Sampson 
Group to the limited partners constituted "securities" within the meaning of 
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78-c(a)(10). 
55. The conduct of Sampson and the Sampson Group as hereinabove alleged 
constituted a device, scheme or artifice to defraud the limited partners. 
56. Sampson and the Sampson Group, directly or indirectly, by the use of a 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, employed a 
device, scheme or artifice to defraud the limited partners, made untrue 
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share are fully authorized, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article II, and Section 2, 
Schedule "B" of the Limited Partnership agreements* 
110. Despite numerous assessments and demands for payment, the Sampson 
Group and the Sampson Partners have willfully refused to make such payments. 
111. As a direct and proximate result of such refusal, Richins, the Richtron 
Affiliates and the Limited Partnerships have suffered injury and damages in an 
amount of at least $2,500,000.00 for which the Sampson Group and the Sampson 
Partners are jointly and severally liable. 
112. The conduct of the Sampson Group and the Sampson Partners has been 
actuated by malice, bad faith and extreme ill will, thereby justifying the 
imposition of punitive damages in the sum of $2,000,000.00. 
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Joint and Several Liability 
of the Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge 
and Tower for Invalid Renewal and Continuance 
of Partnership Affairs) 
113. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 112 above. 
114. Defendants1 continuation of the business affairs of the Limited 
Partnerships in contravention of the Limited Partnership agreements and the Utah 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the blatant exercise by each defendant of 
management and control of the Limited Partnerships' business renders each 
defendant a general partner or co-venturer, thereby subjecting each to joint and 
several liability for the Limited Partnerships1 pre- and post-dissolution debts and 
obligations. 
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants as follows: 
A. On their first Claim for Relief against defendants Sampson, the 
Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge, Tower and John Does 1-30 for: 
1. The sum of $18,000,000.00 representing sustained general and 
special damages in the sum of $6,000,000.00 which, under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), 
should be trebled; 
2. Punitive damages in the sum of $5,000,000.00; 
3. A reasonable attorneys' fee, costs of suit and interest as provided 
by law; and, 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
B. On their Second Claim for Relief against defendants, Sampson, the 
Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge, Tower and John Does 1-30 for: 
1. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining and restraining 
said defendants and their agents or representatives, nominees and/or employees 
from engaging in the activities described in paragraphs 30 and 31 of this 
complaint, ordering divestiture of any interest in their racketeering enterprises 
and dissolving any and all such enterprises; 
2. A reasonable attorneys1 fees, costs and interest as provided by 
law; and, 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
C. On their Third Claim for Relief against defendants, Sampson and the 
Sampson Group, jointly and severally, for: 
1. An order rescinding the transactions between defendants and 
Frontier Investments for the sale and purchase of the described securities; 
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2. Judgment in favor of Frontier Investments against defendants for 
the consideration paid by said plaintiffs assignors for the purchase of the 
securities; 
3. Costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
D. On their Fourth Claim for Relief against defendants, Sampson and the 
Sampson Group, jointly and severally, for: 
1. An order rescinding the transactions between defendants and 
Frontier Investments for the sale and purchase of the described securities; and, 
2. Judgment in favor of Frontier Investments against defendants for 
the consideration paid by said plaintiffs assignors for the purchase of the 
securities, or, in the alternative, for judgment for damages in such amount as 
determined by the court will compensate Frontier Investments for its losses; 
3. Costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
E. On their Fifth Claim for Relief against defendant Sampson for: 
1. Damages of a character and in an amount to be determined by 
the court at the trial of this matter; 
2. Punitive damages in the sum of $2,000,000.00; 
3. Attorneys' fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
F« On their Sixth Claim for Relief against defendant Sampson for: 
1. Damages of a character and in an amount to be determined by 
the court at the trial of this matter; 
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2. Attorneys1 fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
3, Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
G. On their Seventh Claim for Relief, Count I, against defendants, 
Sampson, the Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge, Tower and John 
Does 1-30, jointly and severally, for: 
1. Damages in the sum of $6,000,000.00; 
2. Punitive damages in the sum of $2,000,000.00; 
3. Attorneys' fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
H. On their Seventh Claim for Relief, Count n, against defendants, 
Sampson, the Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Eltinge, Tower and John 
Does 1-30 for: 
1. A temporary and permanent injunction enjoining and restraining 
said defendants from further interference with the Richtron Affiliates' liquidation 
and winding-up of the Limited Partnerships; from further collection, use or 
disposition of the Limited Partnerships1 assets; from further interference with the 
Richtron Affiliates and the Limited Partnerships' existing contractual 
relationships and prospective economic expectancies; and, from further diversions 
of the Limited Partnerships' monies and assets; and, 
2. For costs and such other and further relief as the court deems 
just. 
I. On their Eighth Claim for Relief against defendants, Sampson, the 
Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners, Barbara Sampson, Pearl Blanche, Eltinge, 
Tower, Western Farmers, Consolidated Farms and John Does 1-30 for: 
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1. An accounting from said defendants respecting any and all 
transactions undertaken in connection with the affairs of the Limited Partnerships 
and to an award of damages in an amount to be established by such accounting; 
2. Attorneys' fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
J, On their Ninth Claim for Relief against defendants, Sampson, the 
Sampson Group, the Sampson Partners and Barbara Sampson, Pearl Blanche, 
Eltinge, Tower, Western Farmers and Consolidated Farms for: 
1. The imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien against 
any assets of the Limited Partnerships determined to have been diverted or 
applied to said defendants' personal use or benefit; 
2. Attorneys1 fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
K. On their Tenth Claim for Relief against defendants, the Sampson 
Group and the Sampson Partners, jointly and severally, for: 
1. Repayment of all advances, loans and interest made by the 
Richtron Affiliates to the Limited Partnerships; 
2. Attorneys1 fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
L. On their Eleventh Claim for Relief against defendants, the Sampson 
Group and the Sampson Partners, jointly and severally, for: 
1. An order directing each member of the Sampson Group and the 
Sampson Partners to indemnify and hold harmless the Richtron Affiliates against 
any and all judgments, liabilities, fines, amounts paid in settlement and reasonable 
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expenses actually and necessarily incurred by them in connection with their 
position as general partners of the Limited Partnerships; 
2. General damages in the sum of $2,500,000.00; 
3. Punitive damages in the sum of $2,000,000.00; 
4. Attorneys'fees, costs and interest as provided by law; and, 
5. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
M. On their Twelfth Claim for Relief against defendants, the Sampson 
Group and the Sampson Partners, for: 
1. An order adjudging and declaring that each member of the 
Sampson Group and the Sampson Partners is a general partner or co-venturer in 
each of the Limited Partnerships of which each is a member, thereby subjecting 
each to joint and several liability for any and all pre- and post-dissolution debts 
and obligations of each such Limited Partnership; 
2. Attorneys1 fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and, 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
DATED this *Q day of December, 1984. 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <3c LETA 
y VJvk J-y^^LT-By  
JbhTsT. Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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 OF UTAH 
W. Robert Wright, Esq. 
Christopher L. Burton, Esq. 
Paul H. Harman, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sampson, et al. 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (301) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
PAUL H. RICHINS, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, et al., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. NC84-131 
FES ' " 1985 
PAULL MDGER 
Cierfc 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction came 
on r e g u l a r l y for h e a r i n g on December 27, 1984, and December 
28, 1984. The defendants were represented by W. Robert Wright, 
Christopher L. Burton and Paul M. Harman of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough; p l a i n t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d by John T. Anderson 
of Hanson, Jones, Maycock and Leta . Subsequent to the hear ing, 
-**f * 
the defendants submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to the Court. Plaintiffs objected to defendants' proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On February 15, 1984, 
the Court heard arguments from counsel representing both plaintiffs 
and defendants on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Court having heard and considered the arguments 
and representations of counsel and having reviewed the pleadings 
filed with the Court and good cause appearing for the entry 
of a formal Order, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that; 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 
is denied. 
2. Defendants, John P. Sampson, etal., out of necessity, 
appointed Ag Management, Inc., as the general partner to operate 
the farm properties involved in the matter, and Ag Management, 
Inc., shall continue to act as the general partner for the purpose 
of managing and operating the farm properties in all manner 
and aspects until a decision is rendered at trial. 
3. The Court's ruling at the preliminary injunction, 
r^M^ffl^ , and the' Findings of Fact 
2 
and Conclusions of Law implicit therein, are hereby incorporated 
and made a part of this Order• 
Dated this %*f day of February, 1985 • 
Approved as to form: 
J^JVCMAA**^ 
Jonn T. Anderson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Paul ft^ffarraan 
Attorney for Defendants 
&£r~ Aldon J . Anet^rson 
D i s t r i c t Cqyrt Judge 
Copies mailed to counsel: dp 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
Joseph S. Kncwlton, Esq. 
W. Robert Wright, Esq. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
IliDINL; T ; - 3 DISTRICT 
COUr.t '". Tt'Cf UfAH 
\,VR - 7 1985 
PAULL nADqER 
Clerk 
PAUL H. 
VS. 
JOHN P. 
RICHINS, ET. AL., ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
SAMPSON, ET. AL., ) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
CASE NO, NC 84-131 
COURT1S RULING 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALDON J. ANDERSON 
DECEMBER 28, 1984 
ou*FiLtNa 122 8 -84 
REPORTED BY 
R O B I N CONK, C S R - RPR 
5258 P1NEMONT DRIVE. MURRAY. UTAH 84107 
Careiflm0 Shor thand Rmpartmrm • 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
263-1396 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
LJt3
' OFLTAH 
M'.R-Tiggs 
PAUL L MDGER 
am. 
JOHN T. ANDERSON, ESQ. 
50 W. BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
CHRISTOPHER L. BURTON, ESQ. 
FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
ROBERT WRIGHT 
PAUL HARMAN 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, FRIDAY. DECEMBER 28, 193^, 6:30 P.M. 
THE COURT: THE COURT HAS LISTENED CAREFULLY TO ALL 
THAT HAS BEEN SAID. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND COUNSEL FOR 
THEIR EVIDENT ABILITY IN MASTERING THE FACTS, IN PRESENTING 
LEGAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR POSITION. AND THEY'VE 
BEEN DEFERENTIAL AND RESPECTFUL AND CERTAINLY CONDUCTED 
THE CASE IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER IN A MATTER THAT IS 
OF CONSEQUENCE TO SO MANY PEOPLE. AND I WOULD JUDGE THAT 
THERE ARE MANY GOOD PEOPLE, AT LEAST THOSE WHOM I'VE HAD A 
CHANCE TO OBSERVE, WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THIS DISTRESSFUL 
SITUATION WHERE INVESTMENTS HAVE TURNED SOUR. AS SO OFTEN 
TAKES PLACE, ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, 
AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO PLACE BLAME AND RECAP THEIR LOSSES. 
AND THAT'S WHAT THE COURT EXPECTED THEY WOULD DO. AND THAT 
THOSE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE MAY HAVE TO MAKE GOOD ON THE 
LOSSES OTHERS SUFFERED WHO MAY NOT BE RESPONSIBLE AND THAT 
PHILOSOPHY IS APPROPRIATE IN OUR SOCIETY. 
PLAINTIFFS PRESUMABLY HAVE FILED THEIR ACTIONS IN 
PURSUIT OF THAT GOAL, AND DEFENDANTS HAVE RESPONDED 
3ELIEVING THAT THEIR CAUSE IS JUST IN THAT RESPECT. 
THE ELEMENTS THAT THE COURT MUST CONSIDER IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE 
FILED ARE — THERE ARE FOUR. I SHOULD CONSIDER THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST INVOLVED. WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC INTEREST, THERE 
ISN'T A CRITICAL PROBLEM BECAUSE THE PUBLIC INTEREST, IN A 
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CASE OF THIS KIND, IS TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE AND THOSE 
WHO HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ILLEGAL OR WRONGFUL CONDUCT, 
TH/r CAN BE REMEDIED BY THE LAW, MAKE PAYMENT TO THOSE 
WHO HAVE SUFFERED LOSS AS A RESULT OF THAT. AND SO THE 
PUSLIC INTEREST IS SERVED IF THOSE WHO HAVE RIGHTS THAT 
SHOULD BE ENFORCED ARE ENFORCED AS AGAINST THOSE WHO HAVE 
VIOLATED A DUTY. TO SECURE RELIEF, EACH SIDE IS CLAIMING 
THAT THEY WANT THE COURT'S ASSISTANCE IN THAT RESPECT. SO, 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUE IS NOT ONE THAT WOULD DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED. 
ANOTHER FACTOR THE COURT HAS TO CONSIDER IS THE 
EFFECT UPON THE PARTIES IF RELIEF REQUESTED IS GRANTED, OR 
IS NOT GRANTED. WHAT IS THE EFFECT UPON THE PLAINTIFF IF 
THE REQUEST IS NOT GRANTED AS COMPARED WITH WHAT WILL BE 
THE EFFECT UPON THE DEFENDANTS IF THE RELIEF IS GRANTED? 
AND TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DISRUPTION AND THE 
IMPACT THAT WOULD RESULT. THAT'S IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE 
BECAUSE ESSENTIALLY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS FOR THE 
DURPOSE OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO UNTIL THE FINAL 
TRIAL IS HAD. IT'S TRUE THAT OFTEN, NOT OFTEN, BUT ON 
OCCASION A REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WILL SEEK TO 
ORDER A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OR RELATIONSHIPS BASED UPON 
THE MANIFEST CONDITIONS OR FACTS THAT JUSTIFY AND REQUIRE 
IT. BUT, EXCEPT FOR THIS, COURTS ARE RELUCTANT TO CHANGE 
THF STATUS QUO ON A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE OF THE 
<* 
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1 FACT THAT ON FINAL HEARING IT MAY BE THAT THE MATTER MAY 
2 HAVE TO BE CHANGED TO A DIFFERENT SITUATION. SO, THERE HAS 
3 TO BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE REPRESENTED TO JUSTIFY THAT CHANGE. 
4 NOW, THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE IS RELYING UPON, AS 
5 IT APPEARS TO THE COURT, HIS CLAIM OF MANIFEST RIGHT UNDER 
6 THE STATUTES GOVERNING PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS, 
7 I PARTICULARLY THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP WITH 
GENERAL PARTNER. HE HAS RELIED UPON THE FACT THAT TITLE 
TO THE. PROPERTY IS IN HIS COMPANY, ALTHOUGH, INTERESTINGLY 
THERE HAS 3EEN A RUSH OF FILINGS WITH RESPECT OF DEEDS, 
,1 I APPARENTLY, JUST APPROXIMATELY THE DAY WHEN WE STARTED THE 
t, HEARING, WHICH IS APPARENTLY AN EFFORT TO TIDY UP. BUT, 
NONETHELESS, IT HAS LEGAL EFFECT. 
J4 I SO, WE'RE CONCERNED HERE INSOFAR AS THE IMPACT ON THE 
15 PARTIES IS CONCERNED, WITH THE COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS 
16 AND I HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO THAT. .THE DEFENDANTS, ON 
17 THE OTHER HAND, ARE IN A SITUATION IN WHICH IT APPEARS, IF 
18 THEIR- EVIDENCE IS BELIEVED — AND I CAN'T FULLY DISCOUNT 
,9 I THE EVIDENCE ON EITHER SIDE AT THIS POINT — BUT, IT WOULD 
APPEAR ON THE PRESENT SHOWING THAT THEY HAVE ACTED OUT OF 
A FEELING THAT THEY HAD BEEN ABANDONED AT THE POST AND HAD 
TO DEAL FOR THEMSELVES. I NOTICED IN REFERRING TO EXHIBIT J 
23 I ON PAGE 5, MR. BURTON POINTED TO A QUOTE WHICH INCLUDED 
24 LANGUAGE THAT HE WAS, MEANING MR. RICHINS, WAS GOING TO 
25 WITHDRAW HIS SERVICE UNTIL THEY PAY HIM, AND I THINK HE SAID 
20 
21 
22 
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! THAT ON THE STAND SEVERAL TIMES. I NOTICED IN READING A 
2 LITTLE FURTHER THAT IT SAYS, "AND THE PEOPLE WHO THINK THEY 
3 CAN DO BETTER NOW HAVE THEIR CHANCE." AND THAT SEEMS TO ME 
TO BE SIGNIFICANT. IT'S AN INVITATION FOR THEM. NOT ONLY 
5 I ARE THEY BEING ADVISED THAT HE IS TERMINATING HIS 
6 I RESPONSIBILITY — HE SAYS THAT HE IS TERMINATING 
7 | RESPONSIBILITY — BUT HE'S INVITING THEM TO DO BETTER IF THEY 
8 | CAN. AND THAT'S WHAT THEY DID. THEY UNDERTOOK, AS IT 
9 I APPEARS, TO REORGANIZE THEMSELVES AND TO GET SOMEBODY WHO 
10 
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WOULD REPRESENT THEM WHO IS INFORMED. AND THEY DIDN'T 
11 WANT, APPARENTLY, TO SEE THIS THING WOUND UP IN ANY EVENT, 
12 AND DISSOLVE. THEY WANTED TO TRY TO PRESERVE IT IF THEY 
13 COULD.. BUT, IN ANY EVENT, TO BE THE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN 
14 INTEREST SINCE THEY COULDN'T RELY UPON MR. RICHINS TO DO 
15 THE SAME. AND IF HE HAD A CHANGE OF HEART AND RECOMMUNICATED 
1« AND TOLD THEM HE WANTED TO REPRESENT THEM FURTHER, I DIDN'T 
17 HEAR ANY EVIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO THAT. PERHAPS THE 
18 RESPONSIBILITY WOULD HAVE SHIFTED AND THE ARGUMENT MIGHT 
19 I BE MADE WITH MORE CONVINCING FORCE THAT THESE STATUTES JUST 
HAVE TO BE SERVED. BUT, IT'S HARD FOR THE COURT ON THE 
21 I SHOWING THAT HAS BEEN MADE TO BELIEVE THAT WHERE A RESPONSIBLE 
22
 PERSON, HAVING AFTER ALL OBTAINED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF 
23 DOLLARS IN INVESTMENTS FROM PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO DIRECT 
2* RESPONSIBILITY TO CARRY ON THE WORK — I ASKED MR. RICHINS 
25 ABOUT THAT. IT'S HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE — HIS 
COMPANY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO MANAGE ALL OF THAT MONEY. IT'S 
SURELY UNDER THE STATUTE THE INTENDED OBLIGATION THAT HE ACT 
IN A MANNER OF TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY AND PURSUE IT AND 
TO SEE THAT HE GETS THAT CHANCE. IF HE'S GOING TO 
TERMINATE RESPONSIBILITY AND — AS HE SAID, NOT TAKE CARE 
OF TAX RETURNS, NOT DO THIS, NOT VOLUNTEER ANY SERVICE — 
QUOTE, PEOPLE WHO THINK THEY CAN DO BETTER NOW HAVE THEIR 
CHANCE — INVITE THEM TO DO IT THEMSELVES, CERTAINLY IS 
ARGUABLE. BUT, HE'S CERTAINLY NOT THE PERSON TO CARRY ON IN 
THE EYE OF THE COURT. 
NOW, UNDER CLAIM OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON A STRICT 
ATTEMPT UNDER THOSE STATUTES — JUST TO CHANGE THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, PUT HIM IN UNTIL THE TRIAL IS HELD, HEAR THE 
TRIAL AND THEN — WHO KNOWS — IF IT'S CHANGED BACK OR 
CHANGED FORWARD, THAT'S DIFFICULT. SO, I SEE IN THE FACTS 
PRESENTED THAT THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THE DEFENDANT — 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF MAY PREVAIL ON THIS ISSUE. YOU HAVE A 
STRONG ARGUMENT, MR. ANDERSON, ON THE STATUTES. YOU HAVE 
PRESENTED THAT WELL. AND THOSE ARE FORCEFUL. AND THEY HAVE 
THOSE PARTS THAT HAVE BEEN AMENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
RESOLVING SOME DISPUTES THAT HAVE DEVELOPED, BECAUSE THERE 
WAS TOO MUCH FLEXIBILITY BEFORE. THERE IS A GOOD ARGUMENT 
THERE. BUT, IF I WAS THINKING TO WHAT IT MIGHT BE COMPARED, 
IF MR. RICHINS DIES IN THE MIDDLE OF PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES 
OR BECOMES INCOMPETENT, IT'S CERTAIN THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO 
7 
8 
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1 STILL OBTAIN THE WRITTEN SIGNATURE BEFORE THE THING CAN BE 
2 WOUND UP. TAKE IT A STEP FURTHER, IF HE- SAYS, I WILL NOT DO 
j IT, I'M SICK AND TIRED OF THE WHOLE THING, I DON'T MEAN 
4 THESE ARE THE FACTS, BUT ASSUMING THAT SITUATION, "I WILL 
5 NOT PERFORM AND I WON'T SIGN, T M SICK AND TIRED OF ALL OF 
5 IT, I'M NOT GOING TO SERVE THEM FURTHER." I DON'T THINK 
7 THAT THE LIMITED PARTNERS HAVE TO WAIT AROUND UNTIL THEY 
CAN GET A CONSENT. I DON'T THINK THAT THE STATUTES CAN BE 
APPLIE.D THAT STRICTLY, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT'S THE CASE. 
10 I I THINK UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE HE SAYS I'VE TERMINATED 
ALL RESPONSIBILITY, THOSE WHO THINK THEY CAN DO BETTER HAVE 
THEIR CHANCE AND THEY MAY GO AHEAD AND DO THEIR BEST. 
PERHAPS THEY'VE MADE SOME MISTAKES. WE CAN DECIDE THOSE 
MATTERS ON THE FULL TRIAL. 
BUT, I DON'T THINK YOU'VE MADE A BASIS FOR ASKING 
THE COURT TO CHANGE THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON THOSE FACTS. AND 
I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY SIGNIGICANT EFFORT AS TO WHAT HE DID 
SINCE MAKING THAT STATEMENT EXCEPT AS YOU SAY TO PROSECUTE 
THOSE LAWSUITS. THOSE LAWSUITS, FROM LOOKING AT THE 
FINDINGS THAT I'VE SEEN AND WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, DON'T DEAL 
IN ANY SIGNIFICANT RESPECT WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU'VE 
THROWN BEFORE THIS COURT. BUT, WITH RESPECT TO MANAGEMENT 
AND THOSE OTHER THINGS, I WOULD CONCEIVE OF A PETITION TO 
THE COURT. I WOULD THINK THIS,.THE OPINION OF A RECEIVER 
SHOULD BE ASKED. BECAUSE HE CAN THINK OF A LOT OF THINGS 
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--AT MIGHT BE DONE WITH THE CLAIM THESE PARTIES HAVE MADE 
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,ITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER. IF THEY STATED THE TRUTH ON 
OTH SIDES, IT OUGHT TO BE A THIRD PARTY THAT'S MANAGING 
4 :^ IS MONEY. I JUST DON'T HAVE THE CONVICTION THAT THERE'S 
5 JUSTIFICATION FOR ENTERING THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT 
$ WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE PROPERTY BE MANAGED NOW FROM HERE ON 
7 ' AND DOWN LINE UNDER MR. RICHINS. 
SO, AS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS, I DON'T THINK 
THEREVS A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS. AS TO IRREPARABLE INJURY, 
AS I REFLECTED AND OBSERVED, YOU PROBABLY COULD MAKE A 
PRETTY GOOD ARGUMENT, ASSUMING THAT HE WAS OTHERWISE 
ENTITLED TO IT. BUT HE DOES HAVE MORE THAN JUST A MONEY 
INTEREST INVOLVED IN PROTECTING HIS INVESTMENTS, HIS DREAM, 
HIS ENTERPRISE AND TO SERVE IT OUT, IF HE'S DONE HIS FAITHFUL 
JOB, AS THE COURT WILL ALLOW. I CAN SEE THAT, SO THE COURT 
WILL DENY THE REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. OKAY. 
MR. BURTON: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. ANDERSON: THANY YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I APPRECIATE YOUR ATTENDANCE AND I 
APPRECIATE THE HELP THAT'S BEEN GIVEN. AND MY 
RESPONSIBILITY IS TO MAKE DECISIONS AND IT'S DIFFICULT 
AT TIMES, BUT I JUST HAVE TO DO THE BEST I CAN, PVE TRIED 
TO DO THAT. AND THE COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON COURT WAS ADJOURNED 
AT 6:<t5 P.M.) 
1 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
2 j COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
3 
4 I I, ROBIN CONK, R.P.R., C.S.R., C.P., AND 
5 NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE 
6 OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
7 THAT THE FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE 
8 ME AT THE TIME AND PLACE SET FORTH HEREIN, AND WAS TAKEN 
9 j DOWN BY ME IN SHORTHAND, AND THEREAFTER TRANSCRIBED INTO 
TYPEWRITING UNDER MY DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION. 
n | THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES CONTAIN A TRUE AND 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES SO TAKEN. 
,3 ] IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY NAME 
l4 j THIS V7t,/VDAY OF ^ v, C , 1985? 
15 
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12 
EK(V.:> I j^k^ 
16 
17 
ROBIN CONK 
jg | C . S . R . , R . P . R . , C.P . and 
Notary P u b l i c i n and for 
19 I the County of S a l t Lake, 
S t a t e of Utah. 
20 ' 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Tab 9 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for P la in t i f fs 
8*»5 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
363-3191 
!S:iFEB-l Ri 4: 10 
*-**.- b.^i...Ci LCj.ir 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS, LIMITED, 
a Limited Partnership, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
PAUL H. RICHINS, ARAL WESLEY ALLRED, 
SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, his wife, BANK 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
TENDER 
Civil No. 29700 
7 
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney, 
Joseph S. Knowlton, and tender to the defendants, All reds, the sum of 
$10,431.00, representing the 1980 payment previously ruled to be the 
property of Leo Richins and further the plaintiffs tender to the defendants, 
All reds, the sum of $10,431.00, representing the 1983 payment upon the con-
tract between the All reds and Richtron, Inc. 
DATED this 2^f^y*y of ( ^ 4 ^ 7 , 1984. 
Ml TED 7^ 
by Ken El tinge 
General Partner 
/ i n c t D u c / ' i / k i n u i T A W JOSEPH &r KNOWLTON 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Tender, postage prepaid, this 3° day of ~74(*t(//ff*r , 1984 
/A 
Tab 10 
/ * 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
Notice is hereby given of the withdrawal of RICHTRON, INC., as 
General Partner for the Utah limited partnership known as YOUNG FARMS, LTD,, 
effective upon the 29th day of December, 1980, and that such withdrawal is 
in accordance with the Limited Partnership Agreement of said Partnership on 
file with the Duchesne County Clerk's Office, Roosevelt, Utah, and the 
Davis County Clerk's Office, Farmington, Utah. 
DATED this JL day of January, 1981. 
RIOfTRQN, INC. 
a Utah corporation 
By: /$/ 
PAUL H. RICHINS, President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Davis) 
ss. 
On this day of January, 1981, personally appeared before me 
PAUL H. RICHINS, President of Richtron, Inc., who declared to me that he did 
execute the foregoing Notice of Withdrawal on behalf of Richtron, Inc., by 
authority of corporate resolution of its Board of Directors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day 
and year first above written. 
AL 
Notary Public for the State of Utah 
Residing at Fairnington, Utah 
My Cctrmission Expires: 
11/29/83 PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
e 
RICH 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 225 So. 200 W. Fdrmmgton. Uidh 84025 
Farmington (801) 867-2280 • SLC 531-0200 • Ogden 773-7710 
January 6, 1981 
Davis County Clerk 
Davis County Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
R e :
 Filing Notices of Withdrawal of General Partner. 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the following Notices of Withdrawal of the 
General Partner from the limited partnerships as listed below: 
Partnership Name 
Burley Farms 
Catlow Valley Farms #1 
Catlow Valley Farms #2 
Catlow Valley Farms #3 
Catlow Valley Farms #4 
Catlow Valley Farms #5 
Catlow Valley Farms PQ 
Catlow Valley Farms #7 
East Taber Properties 
North Bear Lake Farms 
North Taber Properties 
Pleasant Valley Farms 
Randlett Investors, Ltd. 
Richtron A-13, Ltd. 
Springfield Properties 
Taber Properties 
Wixom Properties 
is Young Farms, Ltd. 
Your File No. 
(Filed Oct. 11, 1977) 
307 
308 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
(Filed June 13, 1980) 
(Filed Oct. 7, 1977) 
323 
328 
329 
(Filed August 20, 197 
332 
322 
334 
335 
Would you please see that each Notice is properly filed with its 
respective partnership. If you have any questions or need additional 
information, please call. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Paul H. Ri chins 
President 
Enclosures 
RICHTRON. 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 225 So. 200 W. Farmington, Utah 84025 
Farmington (801) 867-2280 • SLC 531-0200 • Ogden 773-7710 
January 6, 1981 
Duchesne County Clerk 
Duchesne County Courthouse 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find a Notice of Withdrawal of the general partner 
from the limited partnerships known as Pleasant Valley Farms and Young 
Farms, Ltd, Would you please see that these two Notices are properly 
filed with the Limited Partnership Agreements you have on file. If you 
have any questions, please contact us. 
Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
Paul H. Ri chins 
President 
ml 
Enclosures - <f/o #o 
Tab 11 
of 1981. 
(Question by Mr. Knowlton) j 
Q Sure, but that means that the plaintiffs then paid j 
the 1980 payment, didn't they? 
A Oh, I don't have any question about that. They did.I 
Q And RICHTRON made the 1980 payment to Allred in 
February, 1981? 
A That's right. j 
Q But they didn't pay the Underlying equity position, ; 
the underlying mortgage, excuse me, to Equitable. 
A To Equitable? 
Q Yes. 
A No. The limited partners said they would pick that 
up. That was part of—we had withdrawn and they wanted to go 
ahead and get somebody else. 
Q Which limited partners made that representation? 
A Ken Jones and let's see. Ken Jones. I think he 
was the main person. He came down to my office and we said 
we had withdrawn and they wanted to go ahead with it and I said, 
if we can do this without a lawsuit and everything else, we 
are willing to transfer or just to step aside on this deal and 
he indicated that that would be the case and everyone was aware 
of it. 
Q When you say everyone— 
A Of the payments not being made to Equitable Life. 
64 
Tab 12 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 204 Executive Building 
^55 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah Mill 
363-3191 
F I L E D 
MAR 4 4982 
R O D N E Y W. W A L K E R Clerk 
Dfivts County, Utah 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS, LTD., a Limited 
Partnership , et. al., 
Plaintiffs, 
RICHTRON, a Utah corporation; 
PAUL H. RICH INS; ARAL WESLEY ALLRED 
and SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, his wife; 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
DOCUMENTATION OF PAYMENT 
OF UNDERLYING OBLIGATION 
Civil No. 2-29700 
Enclosed are copies of documents indicating payment of the under-
lying obligations of the propertys spelled out in the documents submitted 
by the plaintiffs. 
DATED this _ 2 l T ^ a Y o f March, 1982. 
iffi^srl^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MOLING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Documenta-
tion of Payment of Underlying Obligation to David B. Leta, Roe 5 Fowler, 
Attorneys At Law, 3^0 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on 
this ^ ^ of March, 1982. 
.^?Z*: 
v> 
6X2-63! 
HI-2 
T-172696 
UTAH SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE 
JUliulli nil 3"Hni lw tlfrsi' JJiTSruts: that THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, does hereby certify and declare that a certain Mortgage bearing d*tc the l.P.v.1 day 
0f jM.ty. 19 7 2 .. made and executed by ..J......Dorrnnt. Fres ton . . . a l so . .kuown. .as . . . Jesse 
Dorrar* F r c s * 0 " * a n c i a s J e s s i e Dorrant F r e s t o n , and F.thclcne M. F r c s t o n , husband and w i f e . 
to THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, on th<r following described property 
situate »n th* County of Duchesne
 % St.ite of Utah, to wtt: 
j ^ folloa-inf daacrlbad Un4a 1 oca too" la 
Tovnthlp 1 gonth. laata 1 Vaat of"tha glatah taaajal JfarUtaa 
8**ti9n 29t **&**• *** 
tB 9 following daacrtbaa* Us^a loaataa? la 
Twmihtp 2 goath. Mnta I V<j^  of tha fliatab fpoatal XarUtan 
8««*ioo 3i Sks^k. 
ALSO, Baflaataf at tha foatnaaat coraar of tha Mlfcnrfc, thaaaa forth 
,403 faat; thaaaa Vast 364,J foot; thaaaa Saata 20*00' Uat 413.57 faat| 
thaaaa laat MO faat ta tha bafiaaia|t9 
laal1"* § t ***• **&**• 8*#VfenUu JOCtrt a traat af laal altaata la tha ttffVfc •** 
Vfcllfc af #*14 Sactloa I , daaarlboa' •<• fallooa, to-vltt ftaflaaiat ** • 
point al l faat forth ana* 2416 faat Iaat9 aarra ar lata, fro* tha Vaat Qoartar Caraar af aaia" 3actio* 8; rttmlaf thanaa lorth 37+24' laat 841 
faat aarallal ta aaa* 343.92 faat aar^aaJiaaUrly-^lataat loathaaatarly 
fraa an axlatlas «aa4 oola traaaalaaloa llaa aa aal4 la ad ta a faeaa oa 
tha •orthoaatarly bovaa'ary Una af a* la* laaa^ thoaaa forth 20*03' Vaat 
817.77 faat aloof *aH lartbaaatarly bown4arr llaa faaaai taaaaa Saata 
57*26' Vaat 9M.20 faat aarallal ta aa4 234.33 faat aaraanaliaalarlr 41ataat 
Hartbvaatarly froa aaii traaa*>l*aloa llaa ta faaaa aa aaH laaa\ thaaaa 
South 29*01' &aat 100 faat alaaa, *al4 faaaa llaa ta tba poiot af 
ba«taaiat9 ~ 
ALSO* Baflaalag at tha aaatar af aal* Soatiaa l f aaal raaataf taaaaa Soath 
990 faat) thaaaa South 20*11' Saat 1137.3 faat; thaaaa lorth 73*03' Saat 
345 faat; thaaca Soath 30*10' Saat 280.9 faat; thaaca Iarth:i3*03f laat 
442 faat; thaaaa Soath 20*33' Uat 670 faat ta tha Smtb llaa af said 
Saatlaa 8; thaaaa laat 713 faat ta tha Soathaaat aaraar af aal4 faetlaa 
8; thaaaa forth L320 faatt thaaaa Vaat 1320 faat; thaaaa lorth 1320 
faat; thaaca \f^Mt 1320 faat ta tha paiat af bogtnatn*, tXCSTTIatC THXtl-
TOM THK fOtXOVUCi Bagiaaint i t tba So* th aaa t aaraar of Saotlaa 8, 
Tovaahlp 2 South9 laafa 1 Vaat af tha Uintah Soaaial MarlaUaa, aa4 
rvaalag thaaca lorth 300 faat} thaaaa Vaat 300 faat; thaaaa Soath 300 
faat; thaaaa laat 300 faat ta tha aoiat af baflanlaf, 
i s . * day of .UCtODe.C «v..ua. 
IfftOYW 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNtTED STATES 
By (T}/^^^y\^^r 
Richard M. Henry, Asst. 
On this 1.5.t da-/ of October 19 ?*. persona I ly appealed 
befor* m* Richard. M...-Henry w n°. ^'"g by «» fah **ow, did »y he h a kict 
Pftjident of THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, a corporation of the 
State. °^ New York, and that the instrument was signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of its Bylaws, md 
the /V^ President acknowledged to me that the corporation executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto Kt my hand and notarial seal, this the day and year first above 
writtd*-
;. /A.U.. ?.. :.,.:.JL^ xjL.^.dd *,< <& 
JAC"»tI!:ilNC IS'.'X.IHAROT 
N01AWY IW.IU: - -IA!L 0^ MISSOURI 
'SI. l :>UIS COUNTY 
MY COMMIVJIOII iKl'lK-i JAN. 3, 1085 
Wazatf Title & Ener^w Company 
180 East 210U oouth, Suite 102 • Sail t.ake City, Utah 84115 
486-5961 
VeTdcn E Bettilyon Virginia B Godfrey 
October 13, 1981 
Ms. Fern Oberhans lcy 
Basin Land Title *• Abs t r ac t , I n c . 
823 East 2nd North 
Roosevelt , Utah 84066 
Dear Fe rn : 
Enclosed is the Release of the Equitable Mortgage on the Young Farms 
p rope r ty for r e c o r d i n g . Also enclosed is our check for $7.00 to cover 
the recording cos t . 
Very t ru ly y o u r s , 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
VEB 'bjn 
Enclosures 
CLOSINGS TITLE INSURANCE ESCROWS X'lu 
-&n 
M Otf.1 
W H E N R E C O R D E D . MAIL TO: 
' 1
 :.?am Nc?jy^ TIME 3Jl£l... BOOK /£-.£$ PAGE .X£f 
FEE 5 i ^ r * L RCCCRDF.D AT P.FCiJHST C> . . / i f ^ ^ v ! . ^ z X . . . . i ^ < f o . 
- Space Above for Recorder's Use 
WARRANTY DEED 
J. DORRANT FRESTON and ETIIELENE M. FRESTON, husband and wife , grantors 
of Roosevelt , County of Duchesne , State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to ROBERT M. YOUNG and BETTY JEAN YOUNG, 
husband and wife, as joint tenants, not tenants in common, with full right of 
survivorship 
, grantee s 
of Altamont , County of Duchesne , State of Utah 
for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations DOLLARS, 
the following described tracts of land in Duchesne County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U. S. M. 
Section 5; The South half of the Southwest quarter. 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S. M. 
Section 5; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter; thence North 403 feet, thence West 5G6. 5 feet; thence South 20°00f East 
413.57 feet; thence East 480 feet to point of beginning. 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1WEST, U.S.M. 
Section 8: The Northwest quarter; Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter; South 
half of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter. Beginning at the center, thence 
South 990 feet; South 20°18f East 1157.3 feet; North 75°05T East 545 feet; South 30°08t 
East 280. 9 feet; North 75°95T East 642 feet; South 20°35f East 670 feet to South section 
line; thence East 415 feet, North 300 feet, East 300 feet, North 1020 feet, West 1320 feet, 
North 1320 feet, West 1320 feet to point of beginning. Less 17 acres deeded to Utah power 
& Light Co. and 8 acres for State road. 
Together with 103 shares of Dry Gulch Irrigation Co. water, 40 shares of Indian water, 30 
shares of high water, and a 2.56 second feet continuous flow water filing (1913). 
Excepting and reserving all oil, gas., and mineral rights. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this day of December , 19 73 
Signed in the presence of 
O ^ . ^ J D J U W ^ ^ V C < ^ < l ^ 
, £ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
'<> 
STATE OF UTAH, ] ; 'V1^M '/.\ 
83. { -V County of Duchesne J /; : / W-',v'« * . 
On the )Hm day ot • December , * V;V1? TjX 'f> / 
personally appeared before me J. Do^rant Freston and Ethelene M. Freston, husband,anctV : 
wife, ' /.. :';M*: V:%> . 
the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed,trie k 
same. 
. Q v ^ „ _ O l J l ^ X ^ & ^ 
Notary Public\ 
xr • " ^ - / 7 - 7 b T?«*aiHmir in Roosevelt, Utah 
My commission expires ......sr-?....X..f. .*...fel Ke&inmg in —>-. 
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION ^11 
3t& 
[4084i 
21.SKJ-2 ^-/7-£Y &<L»*.SJ J*-Z«L « £ > & , 
Recorded at Request
 n f 180 E a s t 2100 S o u t h , S u i t e 1 0 1 , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 41J 
a t J / / / , M. Fee Paid y 7-'^ ^/7r.d^/-ti^ tO]> Siti,Ll.L 
bv /? . \.'3fl/t.lfouAS 
Mail tax notice to. 
T 
. Dep. Book/?- ? J P n g e ^ ' - f f i L f . : , . 
Add rcsa 
WARRANTY DEED 
ROBERT M. YOUNG & BETIY JEAN YOUNG 
of Iapoint
 f County of 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
Uintah 
YOUNG TAflMS LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of Sal t Lake City, County of Sa l t Lake, State of Utah 
Ten do l l a r s and other good and valuable consideration-
the following described tract s of land in Duchesne 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
See Exhibit "A" attached 
WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors , this 
Septemoer ^ p , 19 8 1 
15th 
Signed in the Presence of ^yf/^r^M 
day of 
Pobert M. Yoi 
SVX& 
11 rr„ /1+t. r^* 
Betty Jean Young !i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Duchesne 
On the 15th day of September 
personally appeared before me 
, A. D. 19 81 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
*£-*&, <f. 
M . . . July 21, HJB4 ., ... 
My commission expires .,,, .- .—Rcsidi 
tary Public. 
ng i n . 
Bountiful, Utah 
"»CANK~g!o t .^ .w» l > l M, . y T - p „ l vL . £ ct5"?Vo "co — sat* so *«<*» * A , T "~ * * L T L A H t C , T Y 7 / 7 l 
Kxnimr 
KHKSTON PROPERTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M. 
Seetion 5: Beginning at the southeast corner of (he northeast quarter of the 
southwest <juarter; thenec North 40;i feet; thenee West r>('ir>..r> feet; thenec 
South 20°0()' East -11:*.57 feet; thenee Kast 4K(> feet to point of beginning. 
Seetion 5: The South half of the Southwest quarter. 
Kxccpting therefrom the* following described properly: Beginning 
at a point 51.2H reel Norlh 0° n-f 1-1" Kast along the N-S 1/4 Section 
line from the S 1/4 eorner (»f r.:\\il Se<-»ioii; ihenee North 20° 17' i 1" 
West 1 .ilOM.'in feet; Ihenee Soulh su° r,:P :I7" Kast 17(i.01 feet; Lhenee 
South 0° 0!' M" Kast 1 ,2H2.r.9 feel, lo point of beginning. Contains 
7.00'.) acres . 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M. 
Section 8: The northwest quarter; southwest i|uarter of the northeast quarter; 
South half of the northwest quarter oT the northeast quarter. Beginning at the 
center; thenee South 090 feet; Ihenee South 20° 18' Kast 1 , 157.:i feet; thence 
North 75° 05' Kast G42 feet; thenee Soulh 20° :i.V Kast r,70 feet to the South 
Section line; thenee Kast 415 feet; thenee Norlh .'JOO feet; thence Kast :100 feet; 
thence North 1,020 feet; thenee West l,:i:!0 feel; thenee North 1 ,M20 feet; 
thenee West 1,.'120 feet to point of beginning. Less 17 acres deeded to Utah 
Power & Light C o . , and 8 acres for Stale Uoad. 
Together with 1 i>:i shares of Dry Oulch Irrigation Co. water, 40 shares of 
Indian water, 110 shares of high water, and a 2 second feet continuous flow 
water filling (lOl.'t) and all or any shares owned by Sellers contingent to this 
property. Excepting and reserving all oi l , gas and mineral rights. 
DOHA J. KRKSTON PROPERTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, U.S .M. 
Section 8: 
Beginning at a point 170.40 feet South 0° 01 • 42" West along the N-S 1/4 Section 
ling from the North 1/4 Comer said Section; thence South 20° 2'V 54" Kast 
510.284 feet; thence South 88° 04' 09" West 178.107 feet; thence North 0° 01' 42 
Kast 484.285 feet to point of beginning. Contains 0.090 acre. 
ALLRKD PROPERTY 
TOWNSHIP 2 South, Range 1 West, Uinlah Special Meridian 
Section 4; The west half of the northwest quarter; the southwest quarter. 
Section 5: The northeast quarter; the north half of the southeast quarter. 
Together with any and all Improvements thereunto, and :I92 shares of Dry Gulch 
High Water Stock. 
Excluding and reserving, therefrom, all oi l , gas and other minerals. 
Tab 13 
defendant. J 
Q RICHTRON doesn't have any rights heref but you I 
received on behalf of the Youngs Farms, $52,000 as RICHTRON, 
ENC. as a general partner, didn't you? J 
A The money went into the escrow between LTD Invest-
ments and Young Farms. LTD Investment paid Young Farms in that 
escrow. I think it was about $52,000. Then out of that escrow 
First Security Bank in Roosevelt, we got $52,000. Took it up 
to the Bank of Utah and made a payment on the Young Farms/ 
RICHTRON escrow. 
Q Now, RICHTRON, INC. is the general partner of Young 
Farms Ltd., isn't it9 Wasn't it at this time? 
A Yes, sir. It was then. It's a liquidating partner 
now. 
Q So, you received $52,000. You put 32, approximately J 
or whatever the contract called for, into escrow to pay off 
RICHTRON, INC. and at the same time there was due a payment 
from RICHTRON to Allreds. Why wasn't that payment made to 
Allreds when the payment was made from Young Farms to RICHTRON? 
A We just couldn't make it at that time. We weren't 
required. We had a grace period and we just took advantage 
of the grace. 
Q Why did you have to borrow or get a gift from your 
father and/or your mother of nine thousand some odd dollars 
to make that payment in February when the money you had received 
43 
Tab 14 
107g 
David E. Leta 
ROE AND FOWLER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
F I L E D 
Cic 
n - : , i 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS LIMITED, a limited 
partnership, PHILLIP 0. BOYER, 
VIRGIL CONDON, BOYD J. FARR, 
HOMER L. HALE, MARIE M. IRVINE, 
G. KENNETH JOHNSON, KENNETH W. 
JONES, ROBERT C. NEWMAN, TOFFIE 
SAWAYA, RICHARD STOVER, WILLIAM 
TINGEY, JAMES E. WATTS, RALPH M. 
WRIGHT, limited partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and PAUL H. RICHINS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING AND 
DENYING MOTIONS 
Civil No. 2-29700 
These matters came before the court upon plaintiffs1 motion for 
injunction, motion for an order compelling discovery, and motion for a 
writ of replevin dated December 9, 1981, and defendants' motion for 
continuance dated December 17, 1981. The motions were heard on 
December 17, 1981, at 10:00 a.m. Present at the hearing were 
Joseph S. Knowlton for plaintiffs and David E. Leta of Roe and Fowler 
for defendants. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the arguments 
of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that all parties to this proceeding are temporarily 
restrained and enjoined, in accordance with Rule 65A, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, from any acts, transactions or conduct affecting or 
107g 
relating to the property in issue in this action pending a hearing on 
plaintiffs' motions, provided, however, that any party may pay or 
satisfy underlying liens and interests of persons or entities having 
claims against the property, but the party engaging in such conduct 
shall bear all risk of loss in connection therewith, and any such action 
shall in no way impair the rights or interests of other parties nor be 
deemed a waiver of any such rights or interests; and, it is further 
ORDERED that defendants' motion for continuance is granted, and 
the clerk of the court shall schedule a one-half day hearing on 
plaintiffs' motions at the earliest available opportunity; and, it is 
further 
ORDERED that defendants shall provide plaintiffs, or their 
representative, with access to bank statements showing withdrawals and 
deposits relating to the operation of Young Farms, Limited, together 
with copies of invoices and cancelled checks relating to the operating 
expenses of Young Farms Limited, provided, however, that plaintiffs 
inspect such records at defendants' principal place of business during 
reasonable business hours and upon reasonable advance notice; and, it 
is further 
ORDERED that all other matters in this action are continued and 
reserved for further hearing. 
DATED this rrI day of December, 1981. 
